Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...tual offender, possession of cannabis 20 grams or less, and possession of drug paraphernalia, Montgomery filed a motion to suppress, contending that the evidence was illegally obtained. Specifically, Montgomery asserted that Florida's noise statute, section 316.3045(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and restricted his right of free expression. Section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (2005), provides, in pertinent part: Operation of radios or other mechanical soundmaking devices or instruments in vehicles; exemptions.— *1026 (1) It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehic...

...In Easy Way, the "plainly audible" standard in a county noise ordinance was found to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. More recently, in State v. Catalano, 60 So.3d 1139, 1143-44 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), the Second District Court of Appeal again addressed the "plainly audible" standard in a challenge to section 316.3045, writing: The challenge in Easy Way was a facial challenge....

...ng applied subjectively, but because the term "plainly audible" was a subjective term on its face; thus, the court found it vague. Id. at 867. But, Montgomery correctly observes that this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to an earlier version of section 316.3045 in Davis v....

...79, 775 P.2d 322 (1989). Id. at 636. [1] When considering the constitutionality of a statute, we first look at the language of the statute itself. See State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1996); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995). Section 316.3045(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical soundmaking device or instrument from within the motor vehicle so that the sound is ... [p]lainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more from the motor vehicle...." Although the phrase "plainly audible" is not defined by statute, pursuant to section 316.3045(4), the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles has promulgated rules defining "plainly audible" and established standards for how sound is measured by law enforcement personnel enforcing the statute....

...Specifically, rule 15B-13.001 states: 15B-13.001. Operation of Soundmaking Devices in Motor Vehicles. (1) The purpose of this rule is to set forth the definition of the term "plainly audible" and establish standards regarding how sound should be measured by law enforcement personnel who enforce Section 316.3045, F.S....

...narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)). Section 316.3045(1)(a) is not content neutral, and therefore, a strict scrutiny standard of judicial review applies....

...k blaring "Eat at Joe's" or "Vote for Smith" plainly audible at a great distance, would be authorized. Clearly, the statute discriminates on the basis of content, not noise. The Second District reached the same conclusion in Catalano, and found that section 316.3045 was unconstitutionally overbroad as a content-based restriction on free expression....

...Turning our attention to the Florida statute at issue, on its face it is not content neutral. The statute excepts from its provisions "motor vehicles used for business or political purposes, which in the normal course of conducting such business use soundmaking devices." § 316.3045(3)....

...ed statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). Applying the objective standard of reasonableness mandated by Krull to the facts presented here, we conclude that a reasonable officer would not have known that section 316.3045(1)(a) was unconstitutional at the time that Montgomery's vehicle was stopped for playing excessively loud amplified music....

...e is to deter future unlawful police conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right of party aggrieved). [3] AFFIRMED. PALMER and EVANDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] After Davis, the Florida Legislature amended section 316.3045(1)(a) by reducing the "plainly audible" distance from 100 feet to 25 feet....

...Cross, 487 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 805, 107 S.Ct. 248, 93 L.Ed.2d 172 (1986). The appellant argues that the stop of his vehicle was pretextual and thus illegal. The appellee relies on the testimony of Officer Lockard as well as section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (1991), which limits the permissible volume of electrical soundmaking devises operated within motor vehicles, to argue that the stop was valid....

LABARGA, J. This case is before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, State v. Catalano, 60 So.3d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), which declared section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (2007), to be invalid....

...1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Second District’s declaration that the statute is invalid because it is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of expression. We also find that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, but not unconstitutionally vague. Finally, we find that section 316.3045(3) is not severable from the remainder of the statute. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Richard Catalano (Catalano) and Alexander Schermerhorn (Schermerhorn) were cited by law enforcement officers in separate incidents in Pinellas County, Florida, for violating the sound standards of section 316.3045(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2007). Catalano, 60 So.3d at 1141 . 2 Specifically, section 316.3045 provides as follows: Operation of radios or other mechanical soundmaking devices or instruments in vehicles; exemptions.— (1) It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or...

...ards regarding how sound should be measured by law enforcement personnel who enforce the provisions of this section. (5) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318. § 316.3045, Fla....

...Operation of Soundmaking Devices in Motor Vehicles. (1)The purpose of this rule is to set forth the definition of the term “plainly audible” and establish standards regarding how sound should be measured by law enforcement personnel who enforce section 316.3045, F.S....

...of persons inside the motor vehicle in areas adjoining churches, schools, or hospitals. Fla. Admin. Code R. 15B-13.001 (2011). Both Catalano and Schermerhorn entered not guilty pleas and moved to dismiss their citations in county court, arguing that section 316.3045 is facially unconstitutional. The county court denied their respective motions based on the Fifth District’s decision in Davis v. State, 710 So.2d 635 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), which found section 316.3045, as originally written prior to the 2005 amendment, constitutional. Catala-no, 60 So.3d at 1142 . Thereafter, Catalano and Schermerhorn changed their pleas to nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of section 316.3045. The county court accepted their pleas and withheld adjudication. Each then appealed to the circuit court of Pinellas County, arguing that section 316.3045 is facially unconstitutional because the “plainly audible” standard is vague, overbroad, invites arbitrary enforcement, and impinges on their free speech rights....

...t’s orders denying the motions to dismiss the citations. Subsequently, the State filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Second District Court of Appeal, arguing that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law because section 316.3045 comports with free speech rights, does not invite arbitrary enforcement, is not vague, overbroad, or content based, and the circuit court failed to follow Davis , which upheld the constitutionality of section 316.3045....

...he law in applying the binding Second District precedent of Easy Way, which held that the “plainly audible” standard of a noise ordinance was unconstitutional. 3 See Catalano, 60 So.3d at 1144-46 . In addition, the majority in Catalano held that section 316.3045(3) is an unconstitutional content-based restriction because it contains an exemption for vehicles used for business and political purposes that use sound-making devices in the normal course of operations. Id. at 1146 . ANALYSIS [I] The State appealed the declaration of invalidity of section 316.3045 and asks this Court to determine whether: (a) the statutory “plainly audible” standard in sec *1075 tion 316.3045(l)(a) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (b) whether the “business/political” exception in section 316.3045(3) is permissible, but even if not, whether the exception should be severed. For the reasons that follow, we find that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague, but is unconstitutionally overbroad and an impermissible content-based restriction. Additionally, we find that severance of section 316.3045(3) is not an appropriate remedy to preserve the constitutionality of this statute. We first examine whether section 316.3045(l)(a) is unconstitutionally vague....

...Brake, 796 So.2d 522, 527 (Fla.2001)). Accordingly, in order to withstand such a challenge, a statute must provide persons of common intelligence and understanding adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. Id. at 527 . As we explain below, we find that section 316.3045(l)(a), which prohibits the amplification of sound from within a vehicle so that it is “plainly audible” beyond twenty-five feet, is not unconstitutionally vague. When considering the constitutionality of a statute, we first look at the language of the statute itself. See State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1996); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995). Specifically, section 316.3045(l)(a) states as follows: Operation of radios or other mechanical soundmaking devices or instruments in vehicles; exemptions....

...to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical soundmak-ing device or instrument from within the motor vehicle so that the sound is: (a) Plainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more from the motor vehicle. § 316.3045, Fla....

...ividual has violated the statute. Indeed, several jurisdictions both in Florida and around the country have upheld similar statutes in the face of vagueness challenges. See, e.g., Montgomery v. State, 69 So.3d 1023, 1032 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (holding section 316.3045(l)(a) is not unconstitutionally vague, but finding the statute unconstitutionally overbroad as an impermissible content-based restriction); Davis v. State, 710 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (upholding pre-2005 amendment version of section 316.3045(l)(a), which required that amplified sound be plainly audible more than one-hundred feet from the vehicle, as not unconstitutionally vague); State v....

...at 791 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 . If the government’s purpose has no relation to the content of the speech, the statute will be deemed neutral even if the restriction affects some speakers or messages and not others. See id. Initially, it would appear that section 316.3045(l)(a) does not regulate expression based on the content of the message as it bans all amplified sound coming from within the interior of a motor vehicle that is “plainly audible” beyond twenty-five feet from the source....

...Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 , 113 S.Ct. 1505 , 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993) *1079 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 , 112 S.Ct. 501 , 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991)). Regardless of the intent of the Legislature, section 316.3045 is a sweeping ban on amplified sound that can be heard beyond twenty-five feet of a motor vehicle, unless that sound comes from a business or political vehicle, which presumably uses sound-making devices for the purpose of expressing commercial and political viewpoints....

...Here, the key determination is whether the over *1081 all legislative intent is still accomplished without the invalid provisions. See Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167, 1173 (Fla.1991) (citing Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 455 So.2d 311, 317 (Fla.1984)). Section 316.3045(l)(a) prohibits individuals from amplifying sound inside their motor vehicles that is “plainly audible” more than twenty-five feet away from the vehicle....

...Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (noting that courts lack the power to construe an unambiguous statute to extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable implications). CONCLUSION Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Second District’s declaration that the statute is invalid. Section 316.3045(l)(a) is an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of expression and is unconstitutionally overbroad, but is not unconstitutionally vague....

...Const, (providing for mandatory review by this Court of decisions of district courts of appeal declaring invalid a state statute or provision of the state constitution). The Second District also certified a question of great public importance: "Is the 'plainly audible' language in section 316.3045( l)(a), Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, arbitrarily enforceable, or impinging on free speech rights?” Catalano, 60 So.3d at 1144 ....

...Catalano and Schermerhorn are now joined as appellees here. . Judge Kelly only concurred with this portion of the opinion that discusses whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law by relying on Easy Way, 674 So.2d at 867 , to conclude section 316.3045(1 )(a) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Catalano, 60 So.3d at 1147 (Kelly, J., concurring specially). Associate Judge Raiden concurred with the opinion, but also wrote separately that, although he was not positive section 316.3045(l)(a) was imper-missibly vague, he joined the majority opinion because subsection (b) of the statute suffers constitutional infirmity as it “permits citations, at least 'in areas adjoining churches, schools, or hospitals,’ for so...

...Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Here, as required by subsection (4), the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DMV) promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rule 15B-13.001. Pursuant to the rule, a violation of section 316.3045(l)(a) occurs when an individual’s vehicle produces sound that can be "clearly heard” more than twenty-five feet away by a law enforcement officer who has a direct line of sight and hearing to the motor vehicle producing the sound...

...to safety on public thoroughfares. Nevertheless, the level of import of the State’s interest here does not change our conclusion on the constitutionality of the statute. . Additionally, in 1990, the same year that House Bill 1383, now codified as section 316.3045, was filed, Senate Bill 2274 was filed and also sought to restrict "sound amplification from within motor vehicles.” Fla....

....” Senate Bill 2274 did not propose an exemption for political speech. House Bill 1383 contained the exemptions which eventually became the law. Fla. H.B. 1383 (1990). Thus, it is likely that the invalid provisions were crucial to the enactment of section 316.3045.

...For example, if an officer observes garbage being thrown from a vehicle, or that the driver is driving naked, or sees a driver shoot at a pedestrian, a stop would appear appropriate. In this case, a violation of the noise statute justified the stop. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (1997).

BLACK, Judge. Defendants, Richard T. Catalano and Alexander Schermerhorn, were issued traffic citations under section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (2007). 1 Section 316.3045 restricts the volume at which a car stereo system may be played on a public street, but it exempts vehicles being used for business or political purposes, which in the normal course of conducting such business use soundmaking devices. For the reasons stated below, we deny the State’s petition for certiorari. I. Factual Background, Mr. Catalano, a practicing attorney, and Mr. Schermerhorn were cited for playing their car radios too loudly, in violation of section 316.3045, which states as follows: Operation of radios or other mechanical soundmaking devices or instruments in vehicles; exemptions— (1) It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operat...

...(5) A violation of this section is a noncriminal traffic infraction, punishable as a nonmoving violation as provided in chapter 318. In county court, Mr. Catalano and Mr. Schermerhorn both pleaded not guilty and moved to dismiss their citations on the grounds that section 316.3045(1) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, invites arbitrary enforcement, and impinges free speech rights....

...2d DCA 1996), the court held that the “plainly audible” standard in a county noise ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and invited arbitrary enforcement. Although Easy Way involved a county noise ordinance and not a traffic control statute, Mr. Catalano argued that section 316.3045(1)(a) must also fail, inasmuch as the statute utilized the “plainly audible” standard. The State argued that Easy Way was not controlling, but rather the Fifth District’s decision in Davis v. State, 710 So.2d 635 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), compelled the conclusion that section 316.3045(1) is constitutional. In Davis , a previous version of section 316.3045 was deemed to be constitutional against a vagueness and over-breadth challenge....

...bound to follow it”) (quoting State v. Hayes, 338 So.2d 51 , 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). The State of Florida filed this timely petition for certiorari review arguing that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law because section 316.3045 does not invite arbitrary enforcement, it comports with free speech rights, and binding precedent found this section constitutional....

...Because we find the circuit court afforded procedural due process and did not violate clearly established principles of law, we deny the State’s petition. In doing so, we certify a question of great public importance: IS THE “PLAINLY AUDIBLE” LANGUAGE IN SECTION 316.3045(l)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, OVER-BROAD, ARBITRARILY ENFORCEABLE, OR IMPINGING ON FREE SPEECH RIGHTS? IV. ' Content-Based Analysis Additionally, while recognizing our agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the circuit court, we note that section 316.3045 suffers from a more fundamental infirmity....

...Turning our attention to the Florida statute at issue, on its face it is not content neutral. The statute excepts from its provisions “motor vehicles used for business or political purposes, which in the normal course of conducting such business use soundmaking devices.” § 316.3045(3)....

...These cases were consolidated for purposes of this opinion because the circuit court issued the same opinion in both cases, and the briefs, the arguments, and the attorneys were identical on appeal. The only difference in these cases was that Mr. Catalano was issued a traffic citation under section 316.3045 on November 13, 2007, and Mr. Schermerhorn's citation was issued on April 11, 2008. . We note that in 2005, after the Davis decision was rendered, the Florida Legislature amended section 316.3045 to change the distance of the plainly audible standard from 100 feet to 25 feet....

...8:09-CV-739-T-33TBM, 2010 WL 962934 , at *3 (M.D.Fla. March 16, 2010) (distinguishing Davis as dealing with the constitutionality of the prior version of the statute and finding two counts in a civil complaint that challenged the constitutionality of section 316.3045, under a First Amendment content-based challenge, were sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).

...al offender, possession of cannabis 20 grams or less, and possession of drug paraphernalia, Montgomery filed a motion to suppress, contending that the evidence was illegally obtained. Specifically, Montgomery asserted that Florida’s noise statute, section 316.3045(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and restricted his right of free expression. Section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (2005), provides, in pertinent part: Operation of radios or other mechanical soundmaking devices or instruments in vehicles; exemptions.— *1026 (1) It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehi...

...In Easy Way, the “plainly audible” standard in a county noise ordinance was found to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. More recently, in State v. Catalano, 60 So.3d 1139, 1143-14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), the Second District Court of Appeal again addressed the “plainly audible” standard in a challenge to section 316.3045, writing: The challenge in Easy Way was a facial challenge....

...pplied subjectively, but because the term “plainly audible” was a subjective term on its face; thus, the court found it vague. Id. at 867. But, Montgomery correctly observes that this Court rejected a vagueness challenge to an earlier version of section 316.3045 in Davis v....

...79 , 775 P.2d 322 (1989). Id. at 636. 1 When considering the constitutionality of a statute, we first look at the language of the statute itself. See State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210, 1212 (Fla.1996); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 472 (Fla.1995). Section 316.3045(l)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]t is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical soundmaking device or instrument from within the motor vehicle so that the sound is ... [pjlainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more from the motor vehicle.... ” Although the phrase “plainly audible” is not defined by statute, pursuant to section 316.3045(4), the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles has promulgated rules defining “plainly audible” and established standards for how sound is measured by law enforcement personnel enforcing the statute....

...Operation of Soundmak-ing Devices in Motor Vehicles. (1)The purpose of this rule is to set forth the definition of the term “plainly audible” and establish standards regarding how sound should be measured by law enforcement personnel who enforce Section 316.3045, F.S....

...narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 , 104 S.Ct. 3065 , 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)). Section 316.3045(1)(a) is not content neutral, and therefore, a strict scrutiny standard of judicial review applies....

...��Eat at Joe’s” or “Vote for Smith” plainly audible at a great distance, would be authorized. Clearly, the statute discriminates on the basis of content, not noise. The Second District reached the same conclusion in Catalano , and found that section 316.3045 was unconstitutionally over-broad as a content-based restriction on free expression....

...Turning our attention to the Florida statute at issue, on its face it is not content neutral. The statute excepts from its provisions “motor vehicles used for business or political purposes, which in the normal course of conducting such business use soundmaking devices.” § 316.3045(3)....

...statute, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 , 107 S.Ct. 1160 , 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). Applying the objective standard of reasonableness mandated by Krull to the facts presented here, we conclude that a reasonable officer would not have known that section 316.3045(1)(a) was unconstitutional at the time that Montgomery’s vehicle was stopped for playing excessively loud amplified music....

...613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (recognizing that exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct, not repair it, and thus, not designed to safeguard personal constitutional right of party aggrieved). 3 AFFIRMED. PALMER and EVANDER, JJ., concur. . After Davis, the Florida Legislature amended section 316.3045(1 )(a) by reducing the "plainly audible” distance from 100 feet to 25 feet....

PER CURIAM. Appellee Summer Allen was stopped pursuant to section 316.3045(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2010), which made it unlawful for a person operating a motor vehicle to operate the radio loud enough to be plainly audible twenty-five feet or more from the motor vehicle....

BLACK, Judge. In this appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(B), the State challenges the trial court’s order granting Lapar Donta Conley’s motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop made pursuant to section 316.3045(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2010). Subsequent to the stop in Conley’s case, this court issued its opinion in State v. Catalano, 60 So.3d 1139, 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), wherein we stated that section 316.3045, Florida Statutes (2007), “is a content-based restriction on free expression which violates the First Amendment.” Conley’s amended motion to suppress was based upon the Catalano opinion, as was the trial court’s order granting the motion. The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 20, 2011, Conley was stopped for a violation of section 316.3045(1), which provides, in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanical soundmaking devi...

...2010); possession of marijuana, in violation of section 893.13(6)(a) and (b); and obstruction of a law enforcement officer without violence, in violation of section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2010). Notably, Conley was not charged with a violation of section 316.3045....

...On May 12, 2011, one day after the issuance of this court’s opinion in Catalano and after presentation of testimony at the April 25, 2011, hearing, Conley filed an amended motion arguing that the traffic stop was illegal as a result of what he alleged was this court’s ruling that section 316.3045 is unconstitutional....

...Although we recognize, as we did in Catalano , that the “plainly audible” standard violates the First Amendment, we disagree with Conley’s assertions that the officer in this ease was not acting in good faith. The issue presented in this case is neither the constitutionality of section 316.3045, see Davis v....

...ns omitted); see also Montgomery, 69 So.3d at 1033 . The Fifth District has considered the issues of whether our Catalano opinion can provide the basis to suppress evidence seized prior to the ruling and whether an officer’s good faith reliance on section 316.3045 is an exception to the exclusionary rule....

PER CURIAM. The state appeals the county court’s order granting Orlando Lockett’s motion to suppress evidence obtained when his vehicle was stopped for a violation of section 316.3045(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Lockett was stopped on March 20, 2008, when a police officer heard music playing from Lockett’s car from about seventy-five feet away. Lockett was charged with driving while his license was suspended and for playing loud music which was audible from more than twenty-five feet away in violation of section 316.3045. The charge under section 316.3045 was subsequently dismissed and the suspended license charge was transferred to county court for jury trial. *1276 Almost three years after Lockett was stopped, the Second District decided in State v. Catalano, 60 So.3d 1139, 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), that section 316.3045 “is a content-based restriction on free expression which violates the First Amendment” because its provisions do not apply to motor vehicles used for business or political purposes....

...utional, and that the officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Therefore, we reverse the order granting Lockett’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and remanded. TAYLOR, DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur. . Section 316.3045(1), Florida Statutes (2008), provides, in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person operating or occupying a motor vehicle on a street or highway to operate or amplify the sound produced by a radio, tape player, or other mechanic...