Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...In General Motors products, the proprietary name is a "Sensing & Diagnostic Module" (SDM). The defendant challenged the admissibility of the SDM data under the general acceptance standard of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), and under the Florida speed recording statute, section 316.1905(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...The Speed Recording Statute The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the EDR/SDM evidence as proof of the speed of the defendant's vehicle because the SDM unit did not comport with the requirements of *408 Florida law for mechanisms used by law enforcement to measure speed. Section 316.1905(1)(2002), Florida Statutes, in pertinent part, states: Whenever any peace officer engaged in the enforcement of the motor vehicle laws of this state uses an electronic, electrical, mechanical, or other device used to determine the sp...

...Questions of statutory construction present legal questions subject to de novo review. State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2004). Legislative intent is the polestar that guides statutory construction. Bruner v. GC-GW, Inc., 880 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 316.1905(2) [2] and section 316.1906, discussing the admissibility of radar speed-measuring devices, make it clear that the legislature intended to regulate the accuracy of devices which are operated by law enforcement officers in determining the speed of moving vehicles, i.e., radar....

...endant's vehicle while the officer was engaged in the enforcement of the motor vehicle laws of the state. It was only after a warrant had been issued and executed that the data from the SDM was obtained. We can discern no legislative intent to apply section 316.1905(1) to the SDM....

...isdiction and was not justified by any statutory or common law exception. The second motion sought to suppress all evidence that Joy was speeding based on the fact that the speedometer in the officer's patrol vehicle was not certified as required by section 316.1905, Florida Statutes (1991) and Rule 15B-2.011 of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles....

..., miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone in violation of section 316.183, Florida Statutes (1977). The validity of this section is not an issue in this proceeding. The primary issue concerns the authority of the legislature to direct, by section 316.1905, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to test and approve speed testing equipment and the validity of the administrative rules adopted by the Department to implement this statutory provision....

...In denying this motion, the trial court held: “[W]hen read separately and when read in conjunction with the Florida Administrative Code 15B-2, et seq., ‘Speed Measuring Devices’, relating to electronic speed control devices (radar) and Florida Statutes, Chapter 316.058, renumbered 316.1905 are constitutional in all respects.” The order further stated that the rules promulgated by the Department *1039 of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles were “adequate and complete as a matter of law,” and that such rules do not “requir...

...conformance with Florida Statutes 120.54, et seq., of the electronic speed control device(s) (radar) operation manual, particularly that of the type of equipment used in this case.” The case proceeded to trial, and the appellant was found guilty. Section 316.1905 1 provides that any officer engaged in the enforcement of speed laws who uses an electronic or mechanical device to determine speed must use the type of equipment that has been approved by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles....

...ests or equipment and the competence of the operator. See State v. Bender. The statute in issue limits law enforcement in its use of electronic or mechanical speed testing devices to those that are approved by a single government department. We find section 316.1905, Florida Statutes (1977), and the implementing administrative rules constitutional....

...ing how this appellant was prejudiced by the amendment in the trial of this cause. For the reasons expressed, we affirm the order of the trial court. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. . 316.1905 Electrical, mechanical, or other speed calculating devices; power of arrest; evidence....

PER CURIAM. The State appeals from a final county court order declaring section 316.1905(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2011), unconstitutional as an infringement upon the supreme court’s authority to promulgate procedural law. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A) and section 26.012(1), Florida Statutes, and reverse the order on appeal. *611 Section 316.1905(S)(b) creates a rebutta-ble presumption that a speed measuring device used by law enforcement to determine a motor vehicle’s speed was timely tested and working properly upon the production of a certificate to that effect....

...nd procedure of the courts in a constitutional sense, causing a constitutional challenge to fail. Id. at 937 (citing Caple v. Tuttle’s Design-Build, Inc., 753 So.2d 49, 54 (Fla.2000) and State v. Raymond, 906 So.2d 1045, 1049 (Fla.2005)). Although 316.1905(3)(b) does appear to be a procedural presumption affecting the burden of production, see Massey, 979 So.2d at 936-37 , we agree with the State that this provision is intimately intertwined with the legislature’s substantive enactments regulating the conduct of motorists on the state’s streets and highways....

...e hearsay evidence in Ryce Act proceedings would fundamentally alter the nature of those proceedings and disrupt the substantive statutory scheme established by the legislature for the civil commitment of sexually violent predators”). In upholding section 316.1905(3)(b), we also note that the rebuttable presumption created by that section does not conflict with any existing procedural rule adopted by the supreme court....

...ment (or at any time since)”). 1 Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SAWAYA, PALMER and LAWSON, JJ., concur. . We agree with the State's assertion that 316.1905(3)(b) merely creates an evidentiary presumption that a speed measuring device was tested and working properly after the certificate is “produced"; it does not also allow the admission of a testing certificate without first establishing adm...

...-one miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone, and was coming towards him. Shortly thereafter, the defendant passed the testifying officer, an eight-year-veteran, at what he described as “an extremely high rate of speed.” Clearly, under section 316.1905, Florida Statutes (1989), the testifying officer could stop the offending driver and later give evidence....

...[Nelson’s] speed according to his radar.” Evidently, the circuit judge was under the impression that the arresting officer should not have been allowed to testify concerning Nelson’s speed “unless the proper predicate [was] laid pursuant to § 316.1905 and § 316.1906, Florida Statutes.” The court apparently overlooked the fact that the prohibitions concerning admissibility of certain radar speed measuring devices are applicable “in any proceeding with respect to an alleged violation of provisions of law regulating the lawful speed of vehicles.......