Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...the department at the place fixed for filing ... on or before the date fixed for filing such return, determined without regard to any extension of time for filing the return, or notification, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the department. See § 220.31(1), Fla....

...1st DCA 1983) (internal citations omitted). The Department's reading of these statutes, to authorize the assessment of interest from the due date of the original return in circumstances like those presented in the subject case, would render meaningless that portion of section 220.31(1), Florida Statutes, which states that a tax is due on or before the date fixed for filing of a notification under section 220.23(2), Florida Statutes....

...The Department's interpretation of these statutes to support the assessment of interest in this case also impermissibly relies on a reading of the statutes in pari materia with section 220.13(2), Florida Statutes, which merely defines taxable *505 income for purposes of the FITC. Sections 220.809 and 220.31(1), Florida Statutes, specifically cover the question at issue in this case....

...It argues first that the statute as a whole evinces a legislative intent to pay interest on a taxpayer's overpayment, if it is not refunded within nine months; here, the Department has been in possession and had the use of St. Joe's overpayment for five years. Elsewhere in the chapter, St. Joe points out Section 220.31, which provides that every taxpayer required to file "a return under this code or a notification under s....

...ion under Section 220.23(2) is the equivalent of the return, as the Department argues, it should not be able to collect interest on the deficiencies because St. Joe paid the tax it owed "on or before the date fixed for filing such ... notification." Section 220.31....

...Sessions, which the USCIS found inapposite before looking to Pascual v. Holder. Ironically, Harbin’s reasoning supports our conclusion regarding NYPL § 220.39’s divisibility. In Harbin, the Second Circuit found that the text of another of New York’s drug trafficking laws, NYPL § 220.31, listed alternative means, rather than individual elements, and was therefore indivisible. 860 F.3d 58, 65–69 (2d Cir. 2011). We agree that § 220.31 is indivisible. And, in fact, comparing §§ 220.39 and 220.31 reveals crucial textual differences between the two statutes, emphasizing § 220.39’s divisibility. Section 220.31 criminalized the USCA11 Case: 21-10763 Date Filed: 08/05/2022 Page: 12 of 17 12 Opinion of the Court 21-10763 knowing and unlawful sale of “controlled substance[s],” defined by reference to New York’s drug schedules. Section 220.31 provides that: A person is guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree when he knowingly and unlawfully sells a controlled substance. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree is a class D felony. NYPL § 220.31....

...marihuana, but including concentrated cannabis as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision four of section thirty-three hundred two of such law. Id. § 220.35. Hence, as the Second Circuit explained in Harbin, the “face of [§ 220.31] [] gives only one set of four elements: the defendant must (1) knowingly and (2) unlawfully (3) sell (4) a controlled substance.” Harbin, 860 F.3d at 65....

...jury must agree on the particular substance sold. If some jurors believed that a defendant had sold cocaine, and others believed that he had sold heroin, they could still agree that he had sold a ‘controlled substance,’ and issue a guilty verdict” pursuant to § 220.31. Id. In other words, NYPL § 220.31 provides “a non-exhaustive list of means by which” a defendant may commit its substantive offense, rather than alternative elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and is therefore indivisible. Oliver,...