CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...Under the
LWO, a covered employer has two options regarding the wages it pays employees.
It can either (1) decline to provide health insurance but pay a higher wage, or (2) it
2
complaint on the grounds that the LWO was preempted by section 218.077,
Florida Statutes (2015), and the LWO’s health plan requirements were no longer
valid, the County was allowed to intervene as an indispensable party to enforce the
LWO against Ultra....
...The County asserted four causes of action in its third-
party complaint against Ultra; the only two counts that concern this appeal are
Counts I and II. Specifically, the County asked the trial court to declare that the
LWO was not preempted by section
218.077, and that the Florida Legislature’s
repeal of section
627.6699(12)(a) did not invalidate the health plan requirements
under the LWO. Ultra and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment
as to these counts, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the County.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's final summary judgment is based on interpretation of
section
218.077 and the LWO, and thus our standard of review is de novo.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc....
..., capital project funds, special
revenue funds, or any other funds either directly or indirectly, whether
by competitive bid process, informal bids, requests for proposals,
4
and we agree, that section 218.077 prohibits local governments from imposing
minimum wage requirements exceeding federal or state minimum wage laws.4 The
statute provides limited exceptions that allow a political subdivision such as the
County to impose minimum wage requirements higher than state or federal
minimum wage.5 The County asserts that Ultra falls under section 218.077(3)(a)2.,
some form of solicitation, negotiation, or agreement, or any other
decision to enter into a contract;
(2) The service contractor is engaged in the business of, or part
of, a contrac...
...Permittee (GASP) or otherwise provides any of the Covered Services
as defined herein at any Miami-Dade County Aviation Department
facility including Miami International Airport pursuant to a permit,
lease agreement or otherwise.
4Section 218.077(2) of the Florida Statutes is a preemption statute that expressly
prohibits political subdivisions of the state from establishing a minimum wage
contrary to state or federal wage requirements....
...aw.
Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution authorizes the Florida
Legislature to preempt municipal powers. Masone v. City of Aventura,
147 So. 3d
492, 495 (Fla. 2014) (“[M]unicipal ordinances must yield to state statutes.”).
5 Section
218.077, Fla....
...ees of an employer contracting to provide
goods or services for the political subdivision,” and therefore allows the County to
impose its own minimum wage requirements on Ultra via the permit agreement,
free from the general wage prohibition of section 218.077(2)....
...s of contractors
that provides services to its clients at MIA, that they in essence also provide
services “for the benefit of or on behalf of” Miami-Dade County. In support of its
position, the County relies upon the definitional provision of section 218.077(1)(c).6
We acknowledge that the County benefits from Ultra’s business in a derivative or
collateral sense, in that the provision of services by Ultra to private air carriers at
MIA ensures that MIA continues to bring air traffic and related businesses to the
area....
...That is not, however, a direct “provision of goods and services” to the
County, and we decline to so hold. If the legislature had intended permit
arrangements, such as the one between the County and GASPs, to be exempt from
the prohibition of section 218.077, it would have carved out that exception with
6 Section 218.077(1)(c) reads:
(c) “Employer contracting to provide goods or services for the political
subdivision” means a person contracting with the political subdivision to
provide goods or services to, for the benefit of...
...unty’s LWO. See Nourse,
340
So. 2d at 969.
Similarly, we reject the County’s contention that Ultra’s lease of property at
MIA is a sufficient contractual basis for enforcing the LWO against Ultra.7 The
lease does not fall within section
218.077’s “under the terms of a contract”
exception because that lease contract must be related to provision of goods and
services to the County. §
218.077(3)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2018). As we have previously
concluded, Ultra does not by contract or otherwise provide “goods or services” to
the County in order for that statutory exception to apply.
Because Ultra does not fall within any of section
218.077’s provisions, we
therefore reverse the order granting final summary judgment on Counts I and II of
Miami-Dade County’s third party complaint, and remand to enter final summary
judgment for Ultra on those counts.
Reversed and remanded.
7We find the decision in Amerijet International, Inc....
CopyPublished | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal
...The City of Miami Beach (“City”), appellant and defendant below, appeals a
summary judgment in favor of Florida Retail Federation, Inc. and other plaintiffs1
(“Appellees”) that invalidated City’s minimum wage ordinance. We agree with the
trial court that section 218.077(2) of the Florida Statutes is a preemption statute
that expressly prohibits political subdivisions of the state from establishing a
minimum wage; and that Article X, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution,
approved by the voters in 2004, did not invalidate section 218.077’s preemption
provision.
I....
...ed a response in
opposition to City’s motion for summary judgment, and filed a brief in this appeal
as an Appellee.
2
The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 2003, the Florida Legislature enacted
section 218.077 which established the federal minimum wage as the minimum
wage for the state of Florida....
...law, regulation, requirement, policy or standard that provides for
payment of higher or supplemental wages or benefits, or that extends
such protections to employers or employees not covered by this
amendment. (Emphasis added.)
2 Section 218.077(2) reads, in its entirety, as follows: “Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (3), a political subdivision may not establish, mandate, or
otherwise require an employer to pay a minimum wage, other than a state or
federal minimu...
...wage for: the local government’s employees, employees of contractors, and
employees of an employer receiving a tax abatement or a subsidy from the local
government. These exceptions are not implicated in this appeal.
3
Notwithstanding section 218.077(2)’s express restriction, City construed this
provision in the amendment as granting it authority to enact a minimum wage
higher than the one authorized by Article X, Section 24....
...Analysis5
City’s principal argument is that the trial court erred by not concluding that
the 2004 amendment to the Florida Constitution, which added Article X, Section
3 Count one of the complaint sought a declaration that the ordinance was invalid
because it was preempted by Section
218.077 of the Florida Statutes, and Count
two sought injunctive relief based upon the same claim.
4 Appellees voluntarily dismissed their injunctive relief claim below pending the
result of this appeal.
5 The trial court’s summary judgment is based on an interpretation of a
constitutional provision. Therefore, our review is de novo. Benjamin v. Tandem
Healthcare, Inc.,
998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008).
4
24, including subsection (f), nullified the preemption provision of section
218.077.
City argues that the 2004 amendment was in “direct response” to the Legislature’s
enactment of section
218.077 in 2003, and the trial court also erred by failing to
give effect to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of this constitutional
provision....
...Indeed, it is without dispute that
Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution6 authorizes the Legislature to
preempt municipal powers. Masone v. City of Aventura,
147 So. 3d 492, 495 (Fla.
2014) (“[M]unicipal ordinances must yield to state statutes.”); and further, that the
Legislature’s enactment of section
218.077 was within the Legislature’s
constitutional authority.
In this case, it is clear that the relevant provision of the amendment contains
no language expressly nullifying or limiting the statute’s preemption provision.
Rath...
...may exercise
any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.”
(Emphasis added.)
6
not directly preempt City’s higher minimum wage, but also (ii) does not nullify or
limit the effectiveness of section 218.077(2), in which the Legislature, through its
power to preempt municipal regulation via statute,7 sought to prohibit political
subdivisions from establishing their own minimum wage.
Certainly, had the drafters of Article X, Sect...
...ordinances such as the one enacted by City in 2016. Further, we reject the City’s
argument that the 2003 statute and the 2004 constitutional amendment cannot be
read in harmony. As we have explained, Article X, Section 24 and Florida Statutes
section 218.077 can stand together without one toppling the other.
III. Conclusion
7 Although compelling in their concern that preemption statutes such as section
218.077 are eroding local government home rule, the two amicus curiae briefs
essentially pose political issues to this Court, which are outside of this Court’s
purview.
7
Because section 218.077(2) of the Florida Statutes prevents a municipality
from adopting its own minimum wage, and the 2004 amendment to the Florida
Constitution does not nullify or limit this statute, we affirm the trial court’s
summary judgment invali...
