Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 859 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons set out below, we reverse the decision of the First District Court of Appeal and uphold the constitutionality of section 193.016, Florida Statutes (2001), requiring a property appraiser to consider the results of an appeal before a value adjustment board (VAB) in the prior year in determining the current just value of tangible personal property....

...PROCEEDINGS TO DATE The appellees include taxpayers who own real estate in Broward and Miami-Dade counties. The taxpayers sued the Department of Revenue and the county property appraisers and sought a declaratory judgment in the circuit court contending that section 193.016 violated the tax assessment provisions of the Florida Constitution by interfering with the property appraiser's discretion to determine just value, and by favoring tangible personal property owners who may have received a reduced assessment from an administrative VAB in the previous tax year. Section 193.016 provides: Property appraiser's assessment; effect of determinations by value adjustment board....

...y the value adjustment board, the property appraiser shall assert additional basic and underlying facts not properly considered by the value adjustment board as the basis for the increased valuation notwithstanding the prior adjustment by the board. § 193.016, Fla. Stat. (2001). The trial court concluded that the requirement in section 193.016 that the appraiser "shall consider" the reduced assessment by the VAB in the prior year did not interfere with the appraiser's authority and discretion to determine just value in accord with article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution....

...onal in its entirety because it created a separate valuation methodology for a special class of property in violation of article VII, section 4. Id. at 621. ANALYSIS The Department of Revenue contends that the First District erred in concluding that section 193.016 violates the just valuation provisions of article VII, section 4....

...Thus, "[t]he property appraiser's determination of assessment value [is] an exercise of administrative discretion within the officer's field of expertise." Mazourek v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 831 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.2002) (quoting Blake v. Xerox Corp., 447 So.2d 1348, 1350 (Fla.1984)). The Department contends that section 193.016 does not violate article VII, section 4's provisions, because the statute merely adds, in essence, a "ninth factor" to section 193.011—the VAB's reduced assessment in the prior year—for the property appraiser to consider along with those other factors set out in section 193.011, when assessing tangible personal property. The Department further argues that the second sentence in section 193.016 simply requires the appraiser to explain his or her actions if he or she decides to assess the value of the property at a higher value than that recently lawfully determined by the VAB. On the other hand, the taxpayers argue that section 193.016 creates an arbitrary and select classification for tangible personal property that has received a reduced valuation in administrative proceedings, and the section's mandate is more than simply an additional neutral factor for consider...

...Taxpayers point to the statute's specific mandate requiring the appraiser to assert a factual basis not considered by the VAB to support any upward departure from the VAB's prior assessment as particularly intrusive to the appraiser's broad discretion. Special Class Initially, we agree with the dissent below that section 193.016 does not arbitrarily create a class of property for favored *644 tax treatment in the way we found unconstitutional in Interlachen and Valencia....

...st value. Interlachen and Valencia are thus readily distinguishable from the present case. Howard, 859 So.2d at 622 (Benton, J., dissenting). We agree with this assessment of our prior case law, and we also agree with Judge Benton's observation that section 193.016's provisions do not run afoul of the constitutional restrictions on the discriminatory classification of property. Rather than providing for a discriminatory classification of property, the provisions of section 193.016 merely require a property appraiser to consider a legal and historical circumstance concerning the valuation of the taxpayer's property....

...Again, we agree with Judge Benton's conclusion: In legal contemplation, moreover, no "class" consisting of property (real, personal or both) for which the value adjustment board adjusts assessments (without being appealed) receives "favored tax treatment." [n.6] [n.6] The majority opinion's assertion that "section 193.016 does provide favored treatment ... increase[ing] the likelihood of a favorable assessment" is not based on any evidence of record. In enacting section 193.016, the Legislature did not "tax different classes of property on different bases." Interlachen, 304 So.2d at 434....

...ct to review by the VAB if challenged by the taxpayer. Accordingly, we agree with the dissent below and the Department that no improper classification has been created. First Sentence Further, we find no absolute requirement in the first sentence of section 193.016 that the appraiser follow the VAB's assessment. As Judge Benton wrote in his dissent, "section 193.016 ....

...Presumably, for example, a wise tax appraiser would not ignore his or her most recent appraisal of the property's just value or a court decision on the same issue. Why should he or she likewise not consider the VAB's recent decision? Second Sentence We also agree with the dissent below that the second sentence of section 193.016 presents a more difficult issue. But, obligated as we are to construe the statute as constitutional if possible, we also find that the requirement in section 193.016 that the appraiser justify his or her decision to upwardly adjust the VAB's assessment does not interfere with the appraiser's discretion because it is simply regulating the procedural method of assessment when there has been a succes...

...Moreover, we agree with the trial court that there is no suspect classification involved, and we agree with Judge Benton that the statute "is not a directive to arrive at any assessment that does not represent just valuation." Howard, 859 So.2d at 622 (Benton, J., dissenting). Because we conclude that section 193.016 is merely a procedural requirement that does not usurp the appraiser's discretion in arriving at just valuation and does not establish a method of valuation or a classification of property that violates the just value provisions of ar...

...eedings consistent herewith. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion. QUINCE, J., dissenting. I would approve the decision of the First District Court of Appeal finding section 193.016, Florida Statutes (2001), unconstitutional because it violates the uniform valuation requirement of article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution....

...This Court has not hesitated to sustain challenges to statutes where there has been a methodology enacted that was applicable to only specific classes of property. See Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom, 543 So.2d 214 (Fla.1989); Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So.2d 433 (Fla.1973). As the First District said: Section 193.016 suffers from the same constitutional infirmity as did the statutes involved in Snyder and Bystrom, because it prescribes a valuation methodology applicable to only a special class of tangible personal property....

...But, except in circumstances specified in article VII, section 4, and not present in this case, it may not provide additional or different factors which are applicable to only a *647 limited class of property. Because this is the effect of both sentences of section 193.016, the statute violates article VII, section 4 of the state constitution and is facially unconstitutional in its entirety. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 859 So.2d 619, 620-21 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (footnote omitted). Because the methodology provided for in section 193.016 involves only a specific class of personal property, I would approve the district court's determination that the section violates the Florida Constitution.

ALLEN, J. This case requires us to decide whether section 193.016, Florida Statutes, violates the uniform valuation requirement of article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution....

...unique to unsold lots in platted subdivisions); Valencia Center, Inc. v. Bystrom, 543 So.2d 214 (Fla.1989)(holding unconstitutional a statute providing a valuation methodology unique to real property subject to specified pre-1965 lease agreements). Section 193.016 suffers from the same constitutional infirmity as did the statutes involved in Snyder and Bystrom , because it prescribes a valuation methodology applicable to only a special class of tangible personal property. The statute provides: 193.016 Property appraiser’s assessment; effect of determinations by value adjustment board....

...But, except in circumstances specified in article VII, section 4, and not present in this case, it may not provide additional or different factors which are applicable to only a limited class of property. 3 Because this is the effect of both sentences of section 193.016, the statute violates article VII, section 4 of the state constitution and is facially unconstitutional in its entirety....

...rily classify property for favored tax treatment.” This observation overlooks two important points. First, although a non-arbitraiy, rational basis might exist for providing a different valuation methodology for the class of property referenced in section 193.016, this is not the proper inquiry for determining whether the statute complies with article VII, section 4....

...Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla.1965). The people of this State, however, by enumerating in their new Constitution which classifications they want, have removed from the legislature the power to make others. Snyder, 304 So.2d at 434 . Second, section 193.016 does provide favored treatment for the class of property referenced therein....