Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...s whether a school board member is a "county" officer, in which event he or she may be suspended only under article IV, section 7(a), or a "district" officer, in which event the school board member could be suspended under the statutory authority of section 112.51, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...If Article IV, Section 7(c) which authorizes suspension of a municipal official indicted for a crime is controlling, must the indictment be a result of actions arising directly or indirectly out of or pertaining to official conduct or duties or is § 112.51(1) an unconstitutional limitation on the constitutional duties of the governor under Article IV, Section 7(c)? "3....

...Question 2: "If Article IV, Section 7(c) which authorizes suspension of a municipal official indicted for a crime is controlling, must the indictment be a result of actions arising directly or indirectly out of or pertaining to official conduct or duties or is § 112.51(1) an unconstitutional limitation on the constitutional duties of the governor under Article IV, Section 7(c)?" We need not answer this question in view of our answer to question one....

...ich is vested in the Governor. It necessarily follows that the Legislature having the full authority to derogate the responsibility of the Governor in this area also has the power to circumscribe said authority which it has done through enactment of Section 112.51(1), Florida Statutes, which provides: "112.51 Municipal officers; suspension; removal from office....

mention of a gubernatorial suspension pursuant to section 112.51. Under the charter, such suspension does not

office until acquitted.” Id. § 7. Moreover, Section 112.51(2) of the Florida Statutes provides: Whenever

...bility to perform his official duties, or commission of a felony." Art. IV, § 7, Fla. Const. Suspensions without compensation have been the policy of the executive branch of this state when persons are indicted or otherwise charged with crimes. See § 112.51(4), Fla....

removed from office by the Governor pursuant to section 112.51, Florida Statutes, run in the special election

...Facts Manuel Maroño was elected to a two-year term as Sweetwater mayor in May of 2013. That term ends on May 12, 2015. After Maroño was indicted on federal corruption charges, the Governor suspended him from office on August 6, 2013, pursuant to section 112.51(2) of the Florida Statutes.1 Subsequently, on January 24, 2014, after Maroño pled guilty to the charges, the Governor removed Maroño from office pursuant to section 112.51(5).2 1 Section 112.51(2) reads, in its entirety, as follows: “Whenever any elected or appointed municipal official is arrested for a felony or for a misdemeanor related to the duties of office or is indicted or informed against for the commission of a federal felony or misdemeanor or state felony or misdemeanor, the Governor has the power to suspend such municipal official from office.” §112.51(2), Fla. Stat. (2013). 2 Section 112.51(5) reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “If the municipal official is convicted of any of the charges contained in the indictment or information by reason of which he or she was suspended under the provisions of this section, the Governor shall remove such municipal official from office....

...assumes the office of mayor.3 Shortly after the Governor suspended Maroño in 2013, Diaz, then the president of the Sweetwater city commission, opted to fill the vacancy created by Maroño’s suspension, pursuant to the terms of Charter section 4.07. Then, upon §112.51(5)....

...akes appeal a final declaratory judgment in favor of Michael A. Pizzi, Jr., determining that Pizzi is entitled to resume his duties as Mayor of the Town of Miami Lakes for the balance of his original term of office.1 We affirm, concluding that section 112.51, Florida Statutes (2013), applied to the temporary suspension of Pizzi by the Governor of Florida in August 2013. Mayor Pizzi’s suspension occurred when he was charged with federal crimes allegedly committed in his official capacity....

...The trial court granted Pizzi’s motion and denied the Town’s and Slaton’s motions. The trial court concluded that Pizzi was not entitled to quo warranto relief or ouster, since Slaton had been legally elected. However, it found that Pizzi was entitled to declaratory relief. The trial court concluded that section 112.51(6), Florida Statutes, required the Governor, upon acquittal of a suspended official, to “forthwith revoke the suspension and restore such municipal official to office . . . .” The Town argued that its Charter provided for the expiration of the suspended mayor’s term, so that under section 112.51, Pizzi could not be reinstated. However, the trial court determined that the Charter could not be 4 interpreted to conflict with section 112.51....

...office filled by appointment for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term, unless these powers are vested elsewhere by law or the municipal charter. The Legislature provided additional detail in section 112.51, Florida Statutes, entitled “Municipal officers; suspension; removal from office.” The 5 parties are on common ground that the Governor had the power under section 112.51(2) to suspend Pizzi from office following Pizzi’s arrest on the federal charges. The parties also agree that the suspension created “a temporary vacancy in such office” under the first sentence of section 112.51(3), though they disagree whether “during the suspension” (in the same first sentence) is supplanted by the Town Charter. Finally, they agree that a special election was appropriate to address the vacancy caused by Pizzi’s suspension. At that point, however, the parties diverge in their assessment of the interplay between section 112.51 and the Town Charter, and regarding the effect of the special election. The provisions of section 112.51 that guide the determination of this dispute are paragraphs (3) through (6) of the statute: (3) The suspension of such official by the Governor creates a temporary vacancy in such office during the suspension....

...7 the term “new Mayor” means that, upon Slaton’s election, Pizzi’s term necessarily expired. Pizzi responds that the Town Charter does not say that; that Slaton’s term was only to fill a “temporary vacancy” as contemplated by section 112.51(3); and that the result proposed by the Town and Slaton would preclude a municipal officeholder from restoration to office for the unexpired term after revocation of a “suspension.” Pizzi argues that the “removal” of the suspended officeholder only occurs upon a conviction under section 112.51(5), and is by law a power of the Governor (not the Town). “In construing statutes, [this Court] first consider[s] the plain meaning of the language used....

...cer, or expiration 3 Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2303 (1st ed. 1986). 8 of a term. The overarching mechanism established by Article IV, section 7, of the Florida Constitution and section 112.51(3) is: the officerholder charged with specified types of crime will be unable to exercise the duties of office pending resolution of the charges. If convicted, the Governor shall remove the suspended officer from office. § 112.51(5) (emphasis provided).4 Had Pizzi been convicted, this would have been the outcome and Slaton would have remained in office to finish “the remaining balance” of Pizzi’s term. But under the Town’s and Slaton’s interpretation, this same result must follow despite Pizzi’s acquittal. The constitutional provision refers to an officeholder “suspended from office until acquitted.” The statute specifies, in section 112.51(6), that a suspended officeholder who is acquitted (of the charges that were the basis for the suspension) is entitled to the revocation of the suspension by the same state official who suspended the officeholder—the Governor—and to be “restored” to the office....

...4 Indeed, under the Town’s and Slaton’s arguments, it would not have been necessary for the governor to “remove” Pizzi from office if convicted, because Slaton’s election would have accomplished that result ten months before his trial and acquittal. To the contrary, section 112.51(5) makes it clear that the suspended officeholder remains in office, but is not permitted to perform official duties, pending conviction and removal. 9 conferred upon Slaton, following the s...

...suspension/restoration to office preempt any Charter provision to the contrary. We do not address that issue in detail, as it is possible to read all three texts in a manner allowing full effect to be given to each. We also conclude that the Town Charter was enacted long after section 112.51 was in place, such that any attempt within the Charter to abrogate the provisions of that statute on suspension and removal would have been explicit....