CopyCited 104 times | Published | Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 15734
...The one person, one vote analogy, as extended to registered Republicans, would be satisfied. The district court and Wymbs, however, overlooked the Florida statute that dictates, in part, the membership of a state executive committee, Republican or Democrat. 42 Fla.Stat.Ann. § 103.091(6)(a) (1982 & 1983 Supp.)....
...ty. Each at-large committeeman or committeewoman shall be entitled to a single vote; however, any such at-large committeemen and committeewomen holding anoth *1089 er voting position on a committee shall be entitled to only one vote. Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 103.091(1) and (6)(a) (1982 & 1983 Supp.) (emphasis added)....
...We conclude that the court dealt only with the county representatives on the Committee because they are the only Committee members mentioned in the court’s dispositive instruments, in the record, and in the briefs on appeal. Nowhere is there any reference to the “at-large” Committee members created by section 103.091(6)(a)....
...atives and the statutory “at-large” members alike, to conform to the one registered Republican, one vote standard, and that the court mandated such realignment. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. A. First, the controlling Florida statute, section 103.091(6)(a), expressly provides that each “at-large” member it creates “shall be entitled to a single vote”; thus, the statute does not permit the Committee to weight the votes of these members 47 In short, the *1090 court was prese...
...red Republicans in their respective districts: the 134 committeemen and committeewomen representing counties, the party leader in the Florida Senate, the party leader in the Florida House of Representatives, 48 the twenty legislators appointed under § 103.091(6)(a), and all Republican U.S....
...49 This would be an impossible task, one well beyond the ability of a federal district judge to supervise. We can best illustrate the difficulty of this task by considering how one would weight the votes of a hypothetical Republican State Senator whom the Senate Minority Leader appointed to the Committee pursuant to section 103.091(6)(a)....
...nto a Serbonian Bog. 52 Landress v. Phoenix Mat. Life Ins. Co.,
291 U.S. 491, 499 ,
54 S.Ct. 461, 473 ,
78 L.Ed. 934 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). When we consider the practical impossibility of this task, the ripeness problem, and the fact that section
103.091(6)(a) in plain terms proscribes weighting in the first place, the only reasonable conclusion- is that Wymbs’ count one claim is non-justiciable....
...d. See Bode,
452 F.2d at 1305-1307 , where the District of Columbia Circuit declined to enforce such a “rigid formula.” 42 . The Florida statute outlining the powers and functions of political parties’ State Executive Committees, Fla.Stat.Ann. §
103.091 (1982 & Supp.1983), applies, of course, to both the Republican and Democratic Party....
...ave upon the State Executive Committee of the Florida Democratic Party. 43 . The rule that two persons from each Florida county — a committeeman and a committeewoman — sit on the Committee is a rule of the Florida Republican Party. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 103.091(1) provides: “A political party may provide for the selection of its national committee and its state and county executive committees in such a manner as it deems proper.” 44 ....
...If Florida’s eight statewide officers, two U.S. Senators, and 19 U.S. Representatives were all Republicans, these officeholders would become members of the Committee as would the 20 party members and two party leaders in the legislature: for a total of 51 additional Committee members. 46 . Section 103.091(6)(a) orders a marked departure from the district court’s and Wymbs’ pristine concept that registered Republicans must equally (and only) represent registered Republicans on the Committee....
...tituencies consisting largely of registered Democrats. Unlike a Committee member chosen only by registered Republicans to represent his or her county, a Republican U.S. Congressman from a heavily Democratic area who is appointed to the Committee via § 103.091(6)(a) may act in the Committee (as well as in the U.S....
...The same holds true for the other Committee members appointed under § 103.-091(6)(a). The statute thus permits non-Republicans indirectly to elect members to the Committee because the only persons eligible for appointment to the Committee by that section are those chosen first by the general electorate. Accordingly, § 103.091(6)(a) corrodes the very heart of Wymbs’ argument, that Committee members only represent, and should only be chosen by, registered Republicans....
...Thus, the Committee cannot comport itself with the district court’s order simply by refraining from filling nomination vacancies and writing rules for the presidential primary. The district court’s injunction, therefore, requires the Committee to violate § 103.091(6)(a) by weighting its members’ votes, or to violate other provisions of Florida law by not performing the two functions at all....
...If the election of each Committee seat were contested, the ballot would contain at least 300 names and obviously would be unmanageable. Moreover, such an election scheme, restricted to registered Republicans, would conflict with the spirit of Fla.Stat.Ann. § 103.091(6)(a)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17821
...Among other things, the conventions, organized on a "grass roots" level were for the purpose of agreeing on endorsements of candidates for uncontested seats in the Legislature from the several districts. In what was described as considerable haste, Sec. 103.091(6), Florida Statutes (1978) was passed through both houses of the Florida Legislature emerging April 13, 1978. In the early afternoon of April 14, 1978, the Governor of Florida signed the statute and it became a viable law. The chronology was not coincidental. Section 103.091(6), Florida Statutes, provides: (6) No state executive committee or county executive committee of any political party or any committee established by a state or county executive committee shall endorse or oppose any candidate of its political party seeking nomination in any primary election....
...Rather, it is argued, the substantive validity or invalidity of the act is the proper question. This is true as to the prayer for declaratory relief. It is not as to the need for injunctive relief. The danger of violation and arrest was manifest if the planned endorsement procedures were carried out. STANDARD OF REVIEW While § 103.091(6) is initially favored with the presumption of constitutionality, this presumption can be dispelled, if as plaintiffs argue, the statute imposes a substantial burden upon and a significant interference with the plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional rights of speech, assembly and political association....
...f the First Amendment." The Mills and Tornillo cases concern legislative restrictions placed on the media (in Mills, the right of a newspaper to endorse on the day of the election). This difference from the instant case is not material in principle. Section 103.091(6) imposes legislative restrictions on the content of political speech....
...argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed." It is the opinion and finding of the Court that Florida Statute 103.091(6) is unconstitutional....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 3rd District Court of Appeal | 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12508, 2009 WL 2601834
...qualifying deadline. This case first requires us to harmonize two statutory provisions in the Florida Election Code: section
99.021, Florida Statutes (2008), regarding the form of candidate oath required by the State public election authorities, and section
103.091, Florida Statutes (2008), describing the rights and duties of political parties and their executive committees....
...made clear that the loyalty oath contained therein was the only oath that could be required of a candidate for county executive committeeperson as a condition for qualifying as a candidate. We find no such intention. To the contrary, and harmonizing section
103.091 (the special provision applicable to political party elections) with section
99.021, we find that the legislature expressly authorized a political party to "provide for the selection of its ....
...Nothing within section
99.021 purports to preclude a political party from imposing other requirements for service on a county executive committee, so long as those conditions are not inconsistent with the minimum requirements found in that section. And turning to section
103.091a set of provisions applicable only to political parties, their executive committees, and their membership ruleswe conclude that it should be given precedence in construing the two statutes in pari materia....
...uld be enjoined. As described in section IV of this opinion, that analysis would impermissibly nullify both (a) the constitutional rights of association of a political party's members and (b) the express statutory grants of authority (in subsections 103.091(1) and (4)) to a political party to elect its state and local executive committee members "in such manner as it deems proper," and pursuant to the party's own internal membership rules....
...on. No such acts are alleged here. Florida's Election Code has therefore recognized that a state may not interfere in the internal governance and operations of political parties. [10] The concurring opinion concludes that, when a party chooses under section 103.091(4) to allow the state's electoral apparatus to conduct the election of executive committee members, the political party surrenders its own rights to impose additional qualifications (beyond those imposed by the statutory oath, but not inconsistent with them) for the positions....
...ed by the Department of State). The mistaken premise in the concurring opinion, however, is that these are the exclusive requirements applicable to a political party executive committee candidate and that those requirements preempt the provisions of section 103.091 (i.e., that the committee operates in accordance with the party's own set of rules). Section 103.091 expresses no such intention, and such a reading contravenes both (a) the principles of statutory construction detailed in section II of this opinion and (b) the constitutional prohibition on state interference in political party governance. The concurring opinion's analysis would create a dilemma in which a political party may either keep its own membership rules and run its own election (section 103.091(1)) or accept a state-run election of the committee members (under section 103.091(4))at the price of being unable to impose or enforce any membership rules other than those fixed by the state....
...oyalty oath, and a filing deadline for that form, so long as it makes the new rule and new form reasonably (and timely) known and available to the prospective candidates. That right does not excuse the candidates' obligations to comply with sections
103.091(4) and
99.021, and of course the Party cannot require the supervisor of elections to monitor compliance with any of the Party's own rules....
...ty." Vieira,
318 So.2d at 492; City of Miami Beach v. Richard,
173 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). III. With the above principles in mind, let us turn to the applicable statutes. The statutory framework for the major political parties is found in section
103.091, Florida Statutes (2008), which states:
103.091 Political parties. (1) ....
...Once it made that decision, the Party must follow the Election Code just like everyone else. *1122 IV. Under the Election Code, candidates including candidates for party officemust file their qualifying papers with the supervisor of elections during the qualifying period. § 103.091(4), Fla....
...committee." §
99.021(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). Thus, the statutory oath must be completed not only by a candidate who qualifies for election, but must also be completed by someone who is chosen by the county executive committee to fill a vacancy. Id.; §
103.091(5)....
...teeman or committeewoman. §
99.021. There is no authority in section
99.021 for the Party to add another oath which operates as an additional de facto condition for election to office. The majority opinion maintains that such authority exists in subsection
103.091(1), Florida Statutes, which states in part, "A political party may provide for the selection of its national committee and its state and county executive committees in such manner as it deems proper." Id. §
103.091(1). The majority opinion is mistaken. The majority opinion takes this one sentence out of context. Later in section
103.091(4), the statute gives a political party the option "by rule [to] provide for the membership of its state or county executive committee to be elected. . . at the primary election. . . ." Id. §
103.091(4). Once the Party voluntarily decides to participate in the election process, the Party must follow the Election Code. The Election Code spells out the oath which is to be taken. Id. §
99.021. Neither section
99.021 nor section
103.091 authorizes the Party to require an additional oath which, as implemented by the Party, amounts de facto to an additional requirement to qualify for election to office....
...The rule establishing the Additional Candidate Condition operates as an additional unauthorized condition on candidacy, and violates the Florida Election Code. The trial court correctly entered the injunction. For the stated reasons, I concur in affirming the temporary injunction. NOTES [1] § 103.091(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). [2] The record indicates that a few of the 19 appellees offered to file the form but did not actually deliver it to the Party's office because they had been told that it would be untimely. [3] § 103.091(1), Fla....
...interests and persuasions that underlie the association's being." [10] Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones,
530 U.S. 567, 574,
120 S.Ct. 2402,
147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000), prohibits such interference, and that is why the specific political party provisions in section
103.091 defer to "the rules of the state executive committee" of the party and allow the party to select that committee "in such manner as it deems proper." [11] In this case, for example, the Party's loyalty oath was to be delivered to the Party office, not the supervisor of elections....
