Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...This information was made available after the court issued a confidentiality order. The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) and the Lakeland Publishing Corporation, doing business as the Lakeland Ledger (Ledger), filed motions pursuant to the Sunshine in Litigation Act (Sunshine Act), section 69.081, Florida Statutes (1991), to set aside the confidentiality order. Based upon allegations that Benlate was a public hazard pursuant to section *228 69.081, the motions sought to have the confidential information made available to the public....

...LLC, and TRW Canada Limited (collectively "TRW") as defendants, based on allegations that TRW had manufactured *915 the seat belt restraint devices in the vehicles, which were defective, and contributed to the occupants' deaths or injuries. Two of the cases pleaded claims under section 69.081, Florida Statutes, commonly known as Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act....

...The Confidentiality Order Finally, the trial court, on Goodyear's motion, granted, over objection, a pre-trial confidentiality order that prohibited the parties and their counsel from disclosing Goodyear documents obtained during discovery. [11] Jones argues that this order should be vacated as it is violative of section 69.081(3), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard. § 69.081(3), Fla....

...To this end, "public hazard" has been statutorily defined as: [A]n instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury. § 69.081(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). Since the jury clearly found that Jones was injured by the tire in question, the tire is deemed a "public hazard." Thus, pursuant to section 69.081(2), no order can be entered which would conceal information regarding this tire....

...ri following a Broward Circuit Court order which denied its motion to limit the scope of referral of issues to a special master. In particular, the trial court referred issues pertaining to the Sunshine in Litigation Act [Sunshine Act], specifically Section 69.081, Florida Statutes, to a special master, and ruled that a determination would have to be made on Sunshine Act issues before the trial court would rule on petitioner's discovery objections in a pending products liability lawsuit....

...idgestone/Firestone, and Bridgestone Corp. The complaint asserted various negligence and products liability claims against appellants, and a claim for declaratory relief against Ford for violation of Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act, codified at section 69.081, Florida Statutes....

...Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984)). Palm Beach Newspapers noted that the non-party press does not have a right of access to pretrial discovery in a criminal case. Respondent has not invoked application of the Sunshine in Litigation Act, section 69.081, Florida Statutes, which expressly acknowledges that it does not apply to trade secrets, proprietary confidential business information and other information confidential under state or federal law, § 69.081(5), (8), Fla....

...a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public hazard. § 69.081(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). Subsection (5) of the Act provides: Trade secrets as defined in s. 688.002 which are not pertinent to public hazards shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688. § 69.081(5), Fla....

...ic hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials. If allowing disclosure, the court shall allow disclosure of only that portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the public regarding the public hazard. § 69.081(7), Fla....

...ourt's mandate instructing it to vacate. We agree with the plaintiffs and conclude that Goodyear waived its right to the hearing it now requests. The Sunshine in Litigation Act prohibits a court from entering an order which conceals a public hazard. § 69.081(3), Fla....

...We disagree that the legitimate purpose of protecting the public from a hazard is met by applying such a narrow interpretation. In order to protect the public from hazardous products, the Act not only prohibits a court from concealing a public hazard, but also from concealing "any information concerning a public hazard." See § 69.081(3), Fla....

...plaintiff's own capacity and knowledge). In sum, the trial court here limited the questions to relevant subject areas. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is denied. NOTES [1] In resolving the instant controversy, we do not construe in any way section 69.081, Florida Statutes (1995), the "Sunshine in Litigation Act" or other similar statutory provisions.

...Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.280(b)(1). Enforcement of the Bond order, absent an adequate statement of good cause within the four corners of the order itself, could run afoul of this public policy. Respondents also brought the attention of the lower tribunal to section 69.081, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Tutt, P.A., Plantation, for appellant. Gina E. Caruso, and Robert K. Tucker of Hinshaw & Culbertson, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. GROSS, J. The question in this case is whether a financing practice that causes only monetary injury is a public hazard within the meaning of section 69.081, Florida Statutes (2000), the Sunshine in Litigation Act (the "Act"). We hold that such a practice is not a "public hazard" within the meaning of section 69.081(2) and affirm the trial court's order granting Ford Motor Credit Company's (FMCC) motion for summary judgment....

...In response, Stivers raised the affirmative defense that the settlement agreement was unenforceable since it violated the Act. Stivers counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the agreement violated the Act. Ultimately, the trial court granted FMCC's motion for summary judgment, ruling that section 69.081 did not apply, since economic fraud in the leasing and financing of automobiles, which was the subject matter of Stivers' expertise, was not a "public hazard" within the meaning of section 69.081(2). Stivers contends that the settlement agreement is unenforceable under section 69.081(4), which provides [a]ny portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result *1025 from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public policy, and may not be enforced. Section 69.081(2) defines a "public hazard" as an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury....

...eadly product defects" and, as a result, "important information affecting public health and safety [was concealed] from public view." Miller, 105 HARV. L.REV. at 430-31, 442. The legislative staff analysis of the statute supports the conclusion that section 69.081 arose from concerns about settlements in product liability cases, where health and safety issues were implicated: Recently, there is a growing concern relating to the practice of settling cases, especially in the products liability are...

...as a "public hazard"); Lovett v. State, 403 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (finding a car that had been involved in a collision was not a "public hazard or nuisance"). Viewing the term "public hazard" in light of the legislative history behind section 69.081, we agree with the trial court that the term connotes a tangible danger to public health or safety....

...The rule of construction will not support an interpretation where "there is neither reason nor policy expressed in the language of the statute" to support an expansive reading of it. Turnberry Isle Resort & Club v. Fernandez, 666 So.2d 254, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). None of the cases citing section 69.081 are helpful here....

Sunshine in Litigation Act (Sunshine Act),' section 69.081, Florida Statutes (1991), to set aside the

...I would deny certiorari on this record on the authority of Ferris v. Ferris, 417 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), and Hemminger v. Hemminger, 391 So.2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), rev. denied, 399 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 1981). NOTES [1] There was some argument initially in the trial court as to whether section 69.081, Florida Statutes, the Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act applies....

...Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act bars a court from entering a protective order which conceals "a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard" or which conceals "information which may be useful to . . . the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from *145 [a] public hazard." § 69.081(3), Fla....

...The Act defines "public hazard" as follows: "[P]ublic hazard" means an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury. § 69.081(2)....

...ic hazard, the court shall allow disclosure of the information or materials. If allowing disclosure, the court shall allow disclosure of only that portion of the information or materials necessary or useful to the public regarding the public hazard. § 69.081(7) (emphasis added). If the discovery dispute concerns trade secrets, the trial court can enter a protective order preventing disclosure of the trade secrets if they are not pertinent to a public hazard. § 69.081(5)....

...party" to examine the disputed documents to determine if they "consist of information concerning a public hazard or information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from a public hazard." § 69.081(7)....

...t be the subject of a confidentiality order. Yet, the trial court did not conduct an in camera review of the documents to determine whether the tires and the information sought by the Schalmos and McClintocks *146 fell within the purview of sections 69.081(2) and (7)....

...If after an in-camera review and hearing from the parties, the trial court concludes that the information or materials fall within the scope of the Act, it must allow disclosure of those portions of the information or materials "necessary or useful to the public regarding the public hazard." See § 69.081(7)....

...involved in the handling of her claim, but labeled them as confidential. Sosnowski subsequently filed a motion to set aside the protective order. Sosnowski argued that the protective order was void under the Sunshine in Litigation Act, specifically section 69.081(3), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides in pertinent part: No court shall enter an order or judgment which has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard, nor shall the court e...

...of benefits to policy holders. After a hearing, the court granted the motion to set aside the protective order, and State Farm seeks certiorari review of that order. Financial practices that constitute economic fraud are not a "public hazard" under section 69.081(3), Florida Statutes *888 (2001). As the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained in Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Company, 777 So.2d 1023 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), rev. dismissed, 790 So.2d 1108 (Fla.2001), the term "public hazard" as defined in section 69.081(2), Florida Statutes (2001), [1] is limited to instances where health and safety issues are implicated, such as in products liability cases....

...We therefore find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in setting aside the protective order. [2] The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the order vacating the prior protective order is quashed. PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED. PLEUS and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 69.081(2) defines "public hazard" as "an instrumentality, including but not limited to any device, instrument, person, procedure, product, or a condition of a device, instrument, person, procedure or product, that has caused and is likely to cause injury." [2] In Alterra Healthcare Corp....

...mo, and Kimberly L. Boldt, Boca Raton, for respondents. Before COPE, LAGOA, and SALTER, JJ. SALTER, J. Ford Motor Company seeks a writ of certiorari quashing an interlocutory circuit court "Order Determining Public Hazard Pursuant to Florida Statute § 69.081." The respondent, plaintiff below, sued Ford following the death of her son in 1997....

...nded." [1] Ford Motor Co. v. Hall-Edwards, 997 So.2d 1148, 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). This latest petition relates to a motion, hearing, and order after the case was remanded for a new trial. The respondent filed a "Notice of Public Hazard Pursuant to § 69.081 and Motion to Prevent the *101 Court from Entering Order Concealing Public Hazard" and noticed the motion for a one-hour evidentiary hearing. The motion asked the trial court to make a finding that "the Ford Explorer" is a "public hazard" under section 69.081, Florida Statutes (2008), [2] and to "enter no order concealing the `public hazard' from the public and prevent Ford Motor Company from concealing any information related to the Ford Explorer, including but not limited to trade secrets...

...cases (including the federal MDL case), and the affidavit of a statistician who had not previously been listed as a witness. Ford moved to strike the respondent's motion and notice on a number of grounds (including the alleged unconstitutionality of section 69.081)....

...rding the admissibility of "other similar incident" evidence), and it therefore granted the respondent's motion. The trial court's order on the notice and motion found "Ford Explorer Models UN 46, UN 105, and UN 150" [4] to be "public hazards" under section 69.081, which "have caused and are likely to cause additional injury to the motoring public." The order also *102 found that the statute was constitutional. Ford's petition to this Court followed. The Statute Section 69.081, captioned "Sunshine in litigation; concealment of public hazards prohibited," prohibits a court from entering an order or judgment concealing "a public hazard or any information concerning a public hazard" or "any information which ma...

...The Second District has held in a similar case that the parties must be afforded an opportunity to present evidence when the statute is sought to be invoked in this fashion. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Analysis First, Florida's Sunshine in Litigation Act, § 69.081, Fla. Stat. (2008), is applicable only if the trial court has entered a confidentiality order, or if there is a pending motion by the defending party for a confidentiality order. See id. § 69.081(3); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jones, 929 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). The trial court has never entered a confidentiality order in this case, nor is there a pending motion for a confidentiality order filed by Ford. The respondent's motion under section 69.081 should have been summarily denied....

...State, 866 So.2d 612, 640 (Fla.2003), "resolution of those claims is unnecessary for the disposition of this case." Conclusion For all these reasons, we grant the petition and quash the circuit court "Order Determining Public Hazard Pursuant to Florida Statute § 69.081" dated November 19, 2008....