The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title V
JUDICIAL BRANCH

Chapter 34
COUNTY COURTS

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CHAPTER 34

COUNTY COURTS

34.01 Jurisdiction of county court.

34.011 Jurisdiction in landlord and tenant cases.

34.017 Certification of questions to district court of appeal.

34.021 Qualifications of county court judges.

34.022 Number of county court judges for each county.

34.031 Clerk.

34.032 Power of clerk to appoint deputies.

34.041 Filing fees.

34.045 Cost recovery; use of the county court for ordinance or special law violations.

34.07 Sheriff to be executive officer.

34.08 Compensation of sheriff.

34.13 Method of prosecution.

34.131 To be open for voluntary pleas of guilty.

34.161 Persons convicted in county court allowed 48 hours to pay fine before being worked.

34.171 Salaries of bailiffs.

34.181 Branch courts.

34.191 Fines and forfeitures; dispositions.

34.01 Jurisdiction of county court.—

(1) County courts shall have original jurisdiction:

(a) In all misdemeanor cases not cognizable by the circuit courts.

(b) Of all violations of municipal and county ordinances.

(c) Of all actions at law, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction of the circuit courts, in which the matter in controversy does not exceed, exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney fees:

1. If filed on or before December 31, 2019, the sum of $15,000.

2. If filed on or after January 1, 2020, the sum of $30,000.

3. If filed on or after January 1, 2023, the sum of $50,000.

Effective July 1, 2030, and every 10 years thereafter, the $50,000 jurisdictional limit in subparagraph 3. must be adjusted and increased by the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average, All Items, 1982-1984=100, or successor reports, for the preceding 10 calendar years as initially reported by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The adjusted jurisdictional limit must be rounded to the nearest $5,000. However, the jurisdictional limit may not be lower than $50,000. The Office of Economic and Demographic Research must calculate the adjusted jurisdictional limit and certify the adjusted jurisdictional limit to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court beginning January 31, 2030, and every 10 years thereafter. The Office of Economic and Demographic Research and the Office of the State Courts Administrator must publish the adjusted jurisdictional limit on their websites.

(d) Of disputes occurring in the homeowners’ associations as described in s. 720.311(2)(a), which shall be concurrent with jurisdiction of the circuit courts.

(2) The county courts shall have jurisdiction previously exercised by county judges’ courts other than that vested in the circuit court by s. 26.012, except that county court judges may hear matters involving dissolution of marriage under the simplified dissolution procedure pursuant to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure or may issue a final order for dissolution in cases where the matter is uncontested, and the jurisdiction previously exercised by county courts, the claims court, small claims courts, small claims magistrates courts, magistrates courts, justice of the peace courts, municipal courts, and courts of chartered counties, including but not limited to the counties referred to in ss. 9, 10, 11, and 24, Art. VIII of the State Constitution of 1885, as preserved by s. (6)(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitution.

(3) Judges of county courts shall also be committing trial court judges. Judges of county courts shall be coroners unless otherwise provided by law or by rule of the Supreme Court.

(4) Judges of county courts may hear all matters in equity involved in any case within the jurisdictional amount of the county court, except as otherwise restricted by the State Constitution or the laws of Florida.

(5) A county court is a trial court.

History.—s. 6, ch. 3730, 1887; RS 1572, 2833; GS 2034, 3890; s. 1, ch. 6463, 1913; RGS 3325, 3326, 5985; CGL 5169, 5170, 8278; s. 3, ch. 63-559; s. 9, ch. 72-404; s. 1, ch. 77-135; s. 1, ch. 80-165; s. 1, ch. 90-269; s. 3, ch. 2000-336; s. 4, ch. 2004-11; s. 31, ch. 2004-265; s. 29, ch. 2004-345; s. 25, ch. 2004-353; s. 9, ch. 2019-58; s. 4, ch. 2021-230.

34.011 Jurisdiction in landlord and tenant cases.—

(1) The county court shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court to consider landlord and tenant cases involving claims in amounts which are within its jurisdictional limitations. The county court may issue a temporary and permanent injunction where appropriate for violation of ss. 83.40 et seq.

(2) The county court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings relating to the right of possession of real property and to the forcible or unlawful detention of lands and tenements, except that the circuit court also has jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the county court or the circuit court otherwise has jurisdiction as provided in s. 26.012. In cases transferred to the circuit court pursuant to Rule 1.170(j), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, or Rule 7.100(d), Florida Small Claims Rules, the demands of all parties shall be resolved by the circuit court.

History.—s. 7, ch. 72-406; s. 2, ch. 74-209; s. 2, ch. 77-135; s. 1, ch. 91-181; s. 9, ch. 93-255.

34.017 Certification of questions to district court of appeal.—

(1) A county court may certify a question to the district court of appeal in a final judgment that is appealable to the circuit court if the question may have statewide application, and:

(a) Is of great public importance; or

(b) Will affect the uniform administration of justice.

(2) In the final judgment, the trial court shall:

(a) Make findings of fact and conclusions of law; and

(b) State concisely the question to be certified.

(3) The decision to certify the question to the district court of appeal is within the sole discretion of the county court.

(4) The district court of appeal has absolute discretion as to whether to answer a question certified by the county court.

(a) If the district court agrees to answer the certified question, it shall decide all appealable issues that have been raised from the final judgment.

(b) If the district court declines to answer the certified question, the case shall be transferred to the circuit court which has appellate jurisdiction.

History.—s. 3, ch. 84-303; s. 6, ch. 2020-61.

34.021 Qualifications of county court judges.—

(1) No person is eligible for election or appointment to the office of county court judge unless the person is, and has been for the preceding 5 years, a member in good standing of the bar of Florida prior to qualifying for election to such office or submitting his or her name to the appropriate judicial nominating commission for appointment. However, a person is eligible for election or appointment to the office of county court judge in a county having a population of 40,000 or less if he or she is a member in good standing of the bar of Florida.

(2) A county court judge is eligible to seek reelection or retention, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1), if, on the first day of the qualification period for election to such office or a retention vote, such judge is actively serving in such office and is not under suspension or disqualification.

(3) Any person who was a county court judge prior to July 1, 1978, in any county having a population of 40,000 or less, according to the last decennial census, and who has successfully completed a 3-year law training program approved by the Supreme Court for the training of county court judges who are not members of The Florida Bar is eligible to seek election or retention and to serve as a county court judge in any county having a population of 40,000 or less, the provisions of subsection (1) to the contrary notwithstanding.

(4) Any county judge who is not a member of the bar, in any county having a population of 40,000 or less, according to the last decennial census, and who has successfully completed a law training program approved by the Supreme Court for the training of county court judges who are not members of The Florida Bar is entitled to serve as a county court judge in any county encompassed in the circuit in which the judge has been elected or retained in a retention vote, when assigned thereto.

History.—s. 10, ch. 72-404; s. 1, ch. 78-346; s. 1, ch. 79-411; s. 1, ch. 83-166; s. 1, ch. 84-303; s. 194, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 99-355.

34.022 Number of county court judges for each county.—The number of county court judges in each county shall be as follows:

COUNTY TOTAL

(1) Alachua..........5

(2) Baker..........1

(3) Bay..........4

(4) Bradford..........1

(5) Brevard..........11

(6) Broward..........32

(7) Calhoun..........1

(8) Charlotte..........3

(9) Citrus..........3

(10) Clay..........2

(11) Collier..........6

(12) Columbia..........1

(13) DeSoto..........1

(14) Dixie..........1

(15) Duval..........17

(16) Escambia..........5

(17) Flagler..........2

(18) Franklin..........1

(19) Gadsden..........1

(20) Gilchrist..........1

(21) Glades..........1

(22) Gulf..........1

(23) Hamilton..........1

(24) Hardee..........1

(25) Hendry..........1

(26) Hernando..........2

(27) Highlands..........1

(28) Hillsborough..........23

(29) Holmes..........1

(30) Indian River..........2

(31) Jackson..........1

(32) Jefferson..........1

(33) Lafayette..........1

(34) Lake..........4

(35) Lee..........9

(36) Leon..........5

(37) Levy..........1

(38) Liberty..........1

(39) Madison..........1

(40) Manatee..........4

(41) Marion..........4

(42) Martin..........3

(43) Miami-Dade..........43

(44) Monroe..........4

(45) Nassau..........1

(46) Okaloosa..........3

(47) Okeechobee..........1

(48) Orange..........19

(49) Osceola..........4

(50) Palm Beach..........19

(51) Pasco..........7

(52) Pinellas..........17

(53) Polk..........10

(54) Putnam..........2

(55) St. Johns..........3

(56) St. Lucie..........4

(57) Santa Rosa..........2

(58) Sarasota..........5

(59) Seminole..........6

(60) Sumter..........1

(61) Suwannee..........1

(62) Taylor..........1

(63) Union..........1

(64) Volusia..........10

(65) Wakulla..........1

(66) Walton..........1

(67) Washington..........1

History.—s. 1, ch. 72-406; s. 2, ch. 73-329; s. 19, ch. 73-333; s. 1, ch. 74-306; s. 2, ch. 76-175; s. 2, ch. 77-368; s. 2, ch. 78-168; s. 6, ch. 79-413; s. 3, ch. 80-164; s. 3, ch. 81-220; s. 3, ch. 82-238; s. 7, ch. 84-303; s. 2, ch. 85-218; s. 2, ch. 86-279; s. 2, ch. 87-89; s. 3, ch. 88-167; s. 2, ch. 89-290; s. 2, ch. 90-206; s. 2, ch. 93-63; s. 4, ch. 94-137; s. 2, ch. 95-351; s. 2, ch. 96-271; s. 2, ch. 97-257; ss. 3, 4, ch. 99-151; s. 2, ch. 2001-284; ss. 3, 4, ch. 2005-150; s. 2, ch. 2005-356; s. 2, ch. 2006-166; s. 3, ch. 2019-95; s. 2, ch. 2020-112; s. 2, ch. 2021-45; s. 3, ch. 2022-163.

34.031 Clerk.—The clerk of the circuit court shall be clerk of the county court unless otherwise provided by law.

History.—s. 11, ch. 72-404.

34.032 Power of clerk to appoint deputies.—

(1) With the concurrence of the chief circuit judge of the circuit, the clerk of the circuit court, in his or her capacity as clerk of the county court, may appoint a deputy clerk or clerks of the county court, for whose acts the clerk shall be liable, and the said deputies shall have and exercise each and every power of whatsoever nature and kind as the clerk may exercise as clerk of the county court, except the power to appoint a deputy or deputies.

(2) Any deputy county court clerk appointed for the sole purpose of issuing arrest warrants for violation of chapter 316 or county or municipal ordinances triable in the county courts shall have and exercise only those powers of the clerk which are required to achieve such limited purpose, and those arrest warrants issued for violation of county or municipal ordinances shall be funded by the county or municipality which approved the ordinance.

(3) Any municipal clerk or deputy municipal clerk appointed as a deputy clerk of the county court shall receive no additional compensation from the state or from any county but may be compensated for such warrant-issuing duties by his or her employing municipality. The limited appointment of any municipal clerk or deputy municipal clerk as a deputy clerk of the county court under this section shall not constitute any appointment to a new office, but rather shall be the conferring of additional powers and duties upon a municipal officer in order to implement revised Art. V of the State Constitution wherein the jurisdiction of municipal courts is transferred to the county courts. It is the expressed intent of the Legislature that the designation of any deputy clerk of the county court herein shall not create any new office but rather shall enlarge the duties and powers of municipal clerks and deputy municipal clerks as provided herein.

(4) Nothing in this section shall limit the power to appoint under s. 28.06.

History.—s. 1, ch. 73-297; s. 195, ch. 95-147; s. 51, ch. 2003-402.

34.041 Filing fees.—

(1)(a) Filing fees are due at the time a party files a pleading to initiate a proceeding or files a pleading for relief. Reopen fees are due at the time a party files a pleading to reopen a proceeding if at least 90 days have elapsed since the filing of a final order or final judgment with the clerk. If a fee is not paid upon the filing of the pleading as required under this section, the clerk shall pursue collection of the fee pursuant to s. 28.246. Upon the institution of any civil action, suit, or proceeding in county court, the party shall pay the following filing fee, not to exceed:

1. For all claims less than $100..........$50.

2. For all claims of $100 or more but not more than $500..........$75.

3. For all claims of more than $500 but not more than $2,500: $170, from which the clerk shall remit $20 to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.

4. For all claims of more than $2,500 but not more than
$15,000..........$295.

5. For all claims more than $15,000..........$395.

6. In addition, for all proceedings of garnishment, attachment, replevin, and distress: $85, from which the clerk shall remit $10 to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.

7. Notwithstanding subparagraphs 3. and 6., for all claims of not more than $1,000 filed simultaneously with an action for replevin of property that is the subject of the claim..........$125.

8. For removal of tenant action..........$180.

The filing fee in subparagraph 7. is the total fee due under this paragraph for that type of filing, and no other filing fee under this paragraph may be assessed against such a filing.

(b) The first $15 of the filing fee collected under subparagraph (a)4. and the first $10 of the filing fee collected under subparagraph (a)8. shall be deposited in the State Courts Revenue Trust Fund. By the 10th day of each month, the clerk shall submit that portion of the fees collected in the previous month which is in excess of one-twelfth of the clerk’s total budget for the performance of court-related functions to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Clerks of the Court Trust Fund. An additional filing fee of $4 shall be paid to the clerk. The clerk shall transfer $3.50 to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Court Education Trust Fund and shall transfer 50 cents to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Administrative Trust Fund within the Department of Financial Services to fund clerk education provided by the Florida Clerks of Court Operations Corporation. Postal charges incurred by the clerk of the county court in making service by mail on defendants or other parties shall be paid by the party at whose instance service is made. Except as provided in this section, filing fees and service charges for performing duties of the clerk relating to the county court shall be as provided in ss. 28.24 and 28.241. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all filing fees shall be retained as fee income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court. Filing fees imposed by this section may not be added to any penalty imposed by chapter 316 or chapter 318.

(c) A party in addition to a party described in paragraph (a) who files a pleading in an original civil action in the county court for affirmative relief by cross-claim, counterclaim, counterpetition, or third-party complaint, or who files a notice of cross-appeal or notice of joinder or motion to intervene as an appellant, cross-appellant, or petitioner, shall pay the clerk of court a fee of $295 if the relief sought by the party under this paragraph exceeds $2,500 but is not more than $15,000 and $395 if the relief sought by the party under this paragraph exceeds $15,000. The clerk shall remit the fee if the relief sought by the party under this paragraph exceeds $2,500 but is not more than $15,000 to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund. This fee does not apply if the cross-claim, counterclaim, counterpetition, or third-party complaint requires transfer of the case from county to circuit court. However, the party shall pay to the clerk the standard filing fee for the court to which the case is to be transferred.

(d) The clerk of court shall collect a service charge of $10 for issuing a summons or an electronic certified copy of a summons, which the clerk shall remit to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the General Revenue Fund. The clerk shall assess the fee against the party seeking to have the summons issued.

(e) Of the first $200 in filing fees payable under subparagraph (a)5., $195 must be remitted to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the State Courts Revenue Trust Fund, $4 must be remitted to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Administrative Trust Fund within the Department of Financial Services and used to fund the contract with the Florida Clerks of Court Operations Corporation created in s. 28.35, and $1 must be remitted to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Administrative Trust Fund within the Department of Financial Services to fund audits of individual clerks’ court-related expenditures conducted by the Department of Financial Services. By the 10th day of each month, the clerk shall submit that portion of the filing fees collected pursuant to this subsection in the previous month which is in excess of one-twelfth of the clerk’s total budget to the Department of Revenue for deposit into the Clerks of the Court Trust Fund.

(2) A party reopening any civil action, suit, or proceeding in the county court shall pay to the clerk of court a filing fee set by the clerk in an amount not to exceed $25 for all claims of not more than $500 and an amount not to exceed $50 for all claims of more than $500. For purposes of this section, a case is reopened after all appeals have been exhausted, or time to file an appeal from a final order or final judgment has expired. A reopen fee may be assessed by the clerk for any motion filed by any party at least 90 days after a final order or final judgment has been filed with the clerk in the initial case. A reservation of jurisdiction by a court does not cause a case to remain open for purposes of this section or exempt a party from paying a reopen fee. A party is exempt from paying the fee for any of the following:

(a) A writ of garnishment;

(b) A writ of replevin;

(d) A writ of attachment;

(e) A motion for rehearing filed within 10 days;

(f) A motion for attorney’s fees filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or final order;

(g) A motion for dismissal filed after a mediation agreement has been filed;

(h) A motion to withdraw by attorneys;

(i) Stipulations and motions to enforce stipulations;

(j) Responsive pleadings; or

(k) Motions for contempt.

(3) If a nonindigent party fails to pay accrued costs, the judge shall have power to deny that party the right to file any new case while such costs remain unpaid and, likewise, to deny such litigant the right to proceed further in any pending case.

(4) In criminal proceedings in county courts, costs shall be taxed against a person in county court upon conviction or estreature pursuant to chapter 939.

(5) Upon the institution of any appellate proceeding from the county court to the circuit court, including any appeal filed by a county or municipality, the clerk shall charge and collect filing fees as provided in s. 28.241(2) from the party or parties instituting the appellate proceedings. If the party is determined to be indigent, the clerk shall defer payment of the fee.

(6) A charge or a fee may not be imposed upon a party for responding by pleading, motion, or other paper to a civil or criminal action, suit, or proceeding in a county court or to an appeal to the circuit court.

(7) For purposes of this section, the term “party” includes a county or municipality filing any civil action.

(8) From each attorney appearing pro hac vice, the clerk must collect a fee of $100 for deposit into the General Revenue Fund.

History.—ss. 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, ch. 26931, 1951; s. 4, ch. 63-559; s. 12, ch. 70-134; s. 12, ch. 72-404; s. 2, ch. 74-154; s. 4, ch. 77-284; s. 15, ch. 79-400; s. 3, ch. 82-205; s. 5, ch. 87-145; s. 8, ch. 89-290; s. 2, ch. 90-181; s. 2, ch. 90-269; s. 4, ch. 91-152; s. 196, ch. 95-147; s. 4, ch. 96-209; s. 2, ch. 96-350; s. 7, ch. 2001-122; s. 52, ch. 2003-402; s. 32, ch. 2004-265; s. 11, ch. 2008-111; ss. 7, 20, ch. 2009-61; s. 7, ch. 2009-204; s. 17, ch. 2010-162; s. 2, ch. 2011-133; s. 6, ch. 2012-100; s. 9, ch. 2013-44; s. 10, ch. 2019-58.

34.045 Cost recovery; use of the county court for ordinance or special law violations.—

(1)(a) In lieu of payment of a filing fee under s. 34.041, a filing fee of $10 shall be paid by a county or municipality when filing a violation of a county or municipal ordinance or a violation of a special law in county court. This fee shall be paid to the clerk of the court for performing court-related functions. A county or municipality is not required to pay more than one filing fee for a single filing against a single defendant that contains multiple alleged violations. A filing fee, other than that imposed under this section, may not be assessed for initiating an enforcement proceeding in county court for a violation of a county or municipal code or ordinance or a violation of a special law. The filing fee shall not apply to instances in which a county or municipality has contracted with the state, or has been delegated by the state, responsibility for enforcing state operations, policies, or requirements under s. 125.69, s. 166.0415, or chapter 162.

(b) No other filing fee may be assessed for filing the violation in county court. If a person contests the violation in court, the court shall assess $40 in costs against the nonprevailing party. The county or municipality shall be considered the prevailing party when there is a plea or finding of violation or guilt to any count or lesser included offense of the charge or companion case charges, regardless of adjudication. Costs recovered pursuant to this paragraph shall be deposited into the clerk’s fine and forfeiture fund established pursuant to s. 142.01.

(c) If the person does not contest the violation in court or if the county or municipality is the prevailing party, the court shall assess the person or nonprevailing party $10 for the filing fee provided in paragraph (a), which amount shall be forwarded to the county or municipality.

(2) To offset costs incurred by the clerks of the court in performing court-related functions associated with the processing of violations of special laws and municipal ordinances, 10 percent of the total amount of fines paid to each municipality for special law or ordinance violations filed in county court shall be retained by the clerk of the court for deposit into the clerk’s fine and forfeiture fund established pursuant to s. 142.01, except for fines a portion of which the clerk of the court retains pursuant to any other provision of state law.

History.—s. 33, ch. 2004-265; s. 22, ch. 2005-236.

34.07 Sheriff to be executive officer.—The sheriff of the county shall serve and execute all civil and criminal processes of said court and do and perform all duties in and about said court, which are required to be performed by an executive officer.

History.—s. 12, ch. 3730, 1887; RS 1575, 2838; GS 2037, 3896; RGS 3329, 5993; CGL 5173, 8287.

34.08 Compensation of sheriff.—The compensation of the sheriff for serving processes in cases in the county court, and for other services in connection therewith, shall be the same as that for like services in the circuit court.

History.—RS 2839; GS 3897; RGS 5994; CGL 8288.

34.13 Method of prosecution.—

(1) All persons tried in the county court on any criminal charge shall be tried upon indictment by the grand jury, upon information filed by the prosecuting attorney, or upon affidavit or complaint.

(2) Upon the finding of indictments by the grand jury for crimes cognizable by the county court, the clerk of the court, without any order therefor, shall docket the same on the trial docket of the county court.

(3) The state attorney is authorized to sign affidavits before the judge of the county court when the state attorney has evidence to support such affidavit for a criminal charge over which such court has jurisdiction. The judge shall issue arrest warrants upon such affidavit as is done in all other cases. This procedure shall be cumulative to all other practice and procedure before such courts.

(4) Upon complaint made on affidavit to any county court that any misdemeanor has been committed, the county court judge may issue a warrant on the usual form, making it returnable before himself or herself or another county court judge.

(5) Municipal prosecutors may prosecute violations of municipal ordinances.

(6) Any circuit court clerk acting as clerk of the county court, or any deputy county court clerk appointed for the sole purpose of issuing arrest warrants, or any county court clerk, may, at municipal expense, administer an oath to and take affidavit of any person charging another person with a violation of a municipal ordinance and may issue a warrant on the usual form, making it returnable to the appropriate county court judge. The authority granted to a clerk or deputy clerk under this section shall be subordinate to that of any state judge.

History.—s. 9, ch. 3730, 1887; RS 2837; GS 3894; RGS 5989; CGL 8283; s. 13, ch. 72-404; s. 2, ch. 73-297; s. 197, ch. 95-147; s. 53, ch. 2003-402; s. 6, ch. 2013-25.

34.131 To be open for voluntary pleas of guilty.—All county courts in this state, in addition to their regular trial terms as now provided by law, shall, at all times, Sundays excepted, be considered open for the reception of voluntary pleas of guilty in all criminal cases pending therein on information, indictment, affidavit, or complaint and for the rendition of judgments and passing of sentences, the same to be entered of record by the clerks of said courts as directed by said judges. And the judges of said courts, at all times, Sundays excepted, may receive such pleas of guilty, when voluntarily offered by the accused, and thereupon at once pronounce judgment of conviction and sentence upon such pleas and direct the entry of the same of record by the clerks of said courts.

History.—s. 2, ch. 4398, 1895; GS 3872; RGS 5967; CGL 8234; s. 1, ch. 24107, 1947; s. 17, ch. 73-333.

Note.—Former s. 32.08.

34.161 Persons convicted in county court allowed 48 hours to pay fine before being worked.—Any person convicted of crime in the county court who shall have a pecuniary fine or sum of money assessed or adjudged against him or her as punishment may, on being taken into custody by the proper officer of the court or prior to such arrest at any time within 48 hours from the time the person is sentenced, pay the said fine and cost or give the bail for the payment of such fine and cost of prosecution, as provided in s. 921.15; and such person convicted in the county court shall not be transferred or turned over to persons working the county prisoners until the expiration of 48 hours from the time such person was sentenced by the court.

History.—s. 14, ch. 72-404; s. 198, ch. 95-147.

34.171 Salaries of bailiffs.—The county shall pay all reasonable salaries of bailiffs.

History.—s. 15, ch. 72-404; s. 54, ch. 2003-402.

34.181 Branch courts.—

(1) Any municipality or county may apply to the chief judge of the circuit in which the municipality or county is situated for the county court to sit in a location suitable to the municipality or county and convenient in time and place to its citizens and police officers, and upon such application said chief judge shall direct the court to sit in the location unless he or she shall determine the request is not justified. If the chief judge does not authorize the county court to sit in the location requested, the county or municipality may apply to the Supreme Court for an order directing the county court to sit in such location.

(2) Any municipality or county which so applies shall be required to provide the appropriate physical facilities as defined in s. 29.008 in which the county court may hold court.

History.—s. 16, ch. 72-404; s. 199, ch. 95-147; s. 55, ch. 2003-402.

34.191 Fines and forfeitures; dispositions.—

(1) All fines and forfeitures arising from offenses tried in the county court shall be collected and accounted for by the clerk of the court and, other than the charge provided in s. 318.1215, disbursed in accordance with ss. 28.2402, 34.045, 142.01, and 142.03 and subject to the provisions of s. 28.246(5) and (6). Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, all fines and forfeitures arising from operation of the provisions of s. 318.1215 shall be disbursed in accordance with that section.

(2) All fines and forfeitures received from violations of municipal ordinances committed within a municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the county court, other than the charge provided in s. 318.1215, shall be paid monthly to the municipality except as provided in s. 28.2402(2), s. 34.045(2), s. 318.21, or s. 943.25. A municipality does not include the unincorporated areas, if any, of a government created pursuant to s. 6(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitution.

(3) All other fines and forfeitures collected by the clerk, other than the charge provided in s. 318.1215, shall be considered income of the office of the clerk for use in performing court-related duties of the office.

History.—ss. 1, 2, ch. 72-70; s. 17, ch. 72-404; s. 3, ch. 80-179; s. 3, ch. 83-215; s. 1, ch. 85-250; s. 1, ch. 85-255; s. 2, ch. 86-154; s. 3, ch. 96-350; s. 2, ch. 98-258; s. 56, ch. 2003-402; s. 34, ch. 2004-265; s. 6, ch. 2005-2; s. 23, ch. 2005-236.

F.S. 34 on Google Scholar

F.S. 34 on Casetext

Amendments to 34

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 34

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S116.34 - FORGERY OF - WO AUTHORITY USE FACSIM SIGNATURE OR AG SEAL - F: S

S116.34 - FRAUD-SWINDLE - USE FACSIM SIGNTR OR AG SEAL ETC WIT DEFRAUD - F: S

S202.34 1a - TAX REVENUE - FAIL TO KEEP PRODUCE COMMUN SVCS TAX RECORDS - M: F

S202.34 1a - TAX REVENUE - FAIL KEEP PRODUC COMMUN SVCS TAX REC SUBSQ OFF - F: T

S319.34 - FRAUD - SELL TRANSFER WO DELIVERY CERTIFICATE OF TITLE - M: S

S319.34 - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - OPR MTR VEH MOBILE HOME W CANC OR WO TITLE ETC - M: S

S319.34 - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - FAIL TO SURRENDER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE - M: S

S322.34 2 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9093 - M: S

S322.34 2 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9094 - M: F

S322.34 2 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 9095 - F: T

S322.34 2 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - REMOVED - F: T

S322.34 2a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DRIV WHILE LIC SUSPEND REVOCATION EQUIV STATUS - M: S

S322.34 2a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - REMOVED - M: S

S322.34 2a - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - REMOVED - M: F

S322.34 2b - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DWLSR REVOCATION EQUIV STATUS 2ND SUBS OFF - M: F

S322.34 2b - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC #8758 - M: F

S322.34 2c - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DWLSR REVOCATION EQUIV STATUS 3RD SUB VIOL - F: T

S322.34 2c - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8839 - F: T

S322.34 5 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DRIVE WHILE LIC SUSP HABITUAL OFFENDER - F: T

S322.34 6a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DRIVE WO LIC CAUSES DEATH/SERIOUS INJURY W VEH - F: T

S322.34 6b - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DRIVE WHILE LIC SUSPENDED DEATH SERIOUS INJURY - F: T

S322.34 7 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DWLSR REV EQUIV STATUS COMMERICAL VEH 1ST OFF - M: F

S322.34 7 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DWLSR REV EQUIV STATUS COMMERICAL VEH 2ND SUBQ - F: T

S322.34 7a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8843 - M: F

S322.34 7b - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 8844 - F: T

S322.34 10a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7161 - M: S

S322.34 10a - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 7162 - M: F

S322.34 10b1 - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - SEE REC #7161 - M: S

S322.34 10b1 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DWLSR OR REVOCATION EQUIV STATUS - M: S

S322.34 10b2 - NONMOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - SEE REC #7162 - M: F

S322.34 10b2 - MOVING TRAFFIC VIOL - DWLSR OR REVOCATION EQUIV STATUS SUBSQ OFF - M: F

S327.34 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - UNLAWFUL TO ALLOW INCAP PERS TO OPER VES - M: S

S384.34 3 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - FALSE REPORT EXISTENCE OF SEXUAL DISEASE - F: T

S384.34 5 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 4124 - F: F

S384.34 5 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - RENUMBERED. SEE REC # 4123 - F: T

S384.34 6 - CRIMES AGAINST PERSON - ID INDIV WHO HAS STD FOR MONEY - F: T

S440.34 - GRATUITY - REMOVED - M: S

S450.34 1 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - ON APP FOR CERTIFICATE OR REGIS NO HARM - M: S

S450.34 1 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - ON APP FOR CERTIFICATE OR REGIS CAUSE HARM - F: T

S450.34 2 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - RE TERMS CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT NO HARM - M: S

S450.34 2 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - RE TERMS CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT CAUSE HARM - F: T

S450.34 3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION FROM WAGES NO HARM - M: S

S450.34 3 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION FROM WAGES CAUSE HARM - F: T

S450.34 4 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RETALIATE AGAINST COMPLAINANT NO HARM - M: S

S450.34 4 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - RETALIATE AGAINST COMPLAINANT CAUSE HARM - F: T

S450.34 5 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - CONTRACT WITH EMPLOY UNREGIS PERSON NO HARM - M: S

S450.34 5 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - CONTRACT WITH EMPLOY UNREGIS PERSON CAUSE HARM - F: T

S520.34 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - REMOVED - M: F

S562.34 - LIQUOR - UNLAW POSSESS SELL TRANS ALCOHOL BEV CONTAINER - F: T

S760.34 - INVADE PRIVACY - HRC EMP DISCLOSE DISCRIM HOUSING COMPL INFO - M: F

S775.34 - PUBLIC ORDER CRIMES - MEMBERSHIP IN DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORG - F: S

S782.34 - HOMICIDE-WILFUL KILL - INTENT KILL PARTIAL BORN LIVING FETUS - F: S

S817.34 - FRAUD-FALSE STATEMENT - BY INVESTMENT COMPANY - F: T

S876.34 - SOVEREIGNTY - COMBINE FORCES TO OVERTURN GOVERNMENT - F: S

Civil Citations / Citable Offenses under S34

R or S next to points is Mandatory Revocation or Suspension

S322.34 (1) Unknowingly operating vehicle while DL SUSPENDED/CANCELED/REVOKED [Can only be used for fail to pay or financial responsibility per 322.34(2)] (Does not apply to HTO/CMV driver - Points on Drivers License: 3

S322.34 (2) Operating while DL SUSPENDED/CANCELED/REVOKED (specify reason) - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (2)(a) Operating while DL Susp/Canceled/Revoked, 1st conviction - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (2)(b) Operating while DL Susp/Canceled/Revoked, 2nd conviction - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (2)(c) Operating while DL Susp/Canceled/Revoked, 3rd or subsequent - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (5) Operating while DL REVOKED for Habitual Traffic Offender - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (6)(a) Operating without a DL causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury, Felony of 3rd degree - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (6)(b) Operating while DL Susp/Canceled/Revoked causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury, Felony of 3rd degree - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (7) Operating CMV while DL is SUSPENDED/CANCELED/REVOKED/DISQUALIFIED - Points on Drivers License: 0

S322.34 (10)(a) Operating while DL SUSPENDED/CANCELED/REVOKED (specify reason) IF NO PRIOR FORCIBLE FELONY - Points on Drivers License: 0

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. TRUMP, v. R. VANCE, Jr., 140 S. Ct. 2412 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Burr , 25 F.Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. . . . Id. , at 34. . . . subpoenas have issued ; not in any circumstance which is to precede their being issued." 25 F.Cas. at 34 . . . Zivotofsky , 576 U.S. at 34-35, 135 S.Ct. 2076 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). . . . Id. , at 34. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. See, e.g. , American Ins. Assn. v. . . . Burr , 25 F.Cas. 30, 33-34 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). . . . Id. , at 34. But, as Marshall explained, a king is born to power and can "do no wrong." Ibid. . . . Id. , at 34. . . . Minnesota , 232 U.S. 516, 521, 34 S.Ct. 354, 58 L.Ed. 706 (1914). . . . Burr , 25 F.Cas. at 34. . . . that they are competent for a necessary part of them"); In re Neagle , 135 U.S. 1, 75, 10 S.Ct. 658, 34 . . . Muskus, New York Practice with Forms, 33A Carmody-Wait 2d § 186:34 (June 2020). S. . . .

MCGIRT, v. OKLAHOMA, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . §§ 6, 10, 28, 34 Stat. 139-140, 148. . . . Act of June 16, 1906, § 20, 34 Stat. 277; see also Act of Mar. 4, 1907, § 3, 34 Stat. 1287 (clarifying . . . Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137. . . . Ante , at 2466 (quoting § 28, 34 Stat. 148). . . . See § 16, 34 Stat. 276. . . .

B. CHIAFALO, v. WASHINGTON, 140 S. Ct. 2316 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See Albright, The Presidential Short Ballot, 34 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 955, 955-957 (1940). . . .

P. BARR, v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . underlying 1889 state law generally prohibiting the manufacture of alcohol. 232 U.S. 700, 704-705, 34 . . . Brief for Respondents 34. . . .

ESPINOZA, v. MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (U.S. 2020)

. . . V, § 34, Art. IX, § 7 (1876); Del. Const., Art. X, § 3 (1897) ; Ind. Const., Art. . . . See id., at 34-35; D. Drakeman, Church, State, and Original Intent 224-225 (2010). . . .

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO, v. LLC., 140 S. Ct. 2103 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id., at 33-34. It also heard from several other witnesses via deposition. Ibid. . . . S. ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018) (slip op., at 34-35). . . . See Response and Reply for Petitioners (No. 18-1460)/Cross- Respondents (No. 181323), p. 34, 764 Fed.Appx . . . XXX, ch. 153, §§ 32, 33, 34 (1846); Terr. of Minn. Rev. Stat., ch. 100, §§ 10, 11 (1851); Miss. . . .

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, v. THURAISSIGIAM, 140 S. Ct. 1959 (U.S. 2020)

. . . It relied heavily on Ekiu to support its determination that the Immigration Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 898 . . . Rev. 30, 34 (1949). . . . See Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 390; Immigration Act of 1907, § 25, 34 Stat. 907; Immigration Act of 1917, . . .

KANSAS v. C. BOETTGER v., 140 S. Ct. 1956 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Laws § 34, pp. 68-69; 1827 Ill. Laws p. 145; 1816 Mich. Pub. Acts p. 24; 1816 Ga. Laws p. 178. . . .

BOSTOCK, v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA v. Jr. Co- R. G. G. R. v., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Eskridge, Interpreting Law 33, 34-35 (2016) (footnote omitted). . . . recipients to collect statistics on crimes motivated by the victim's "gender, ... sexual orientation"); 34 . . . Stat. § 24-34-402(1)(a) (2019) (prohibiting discrimination because of "sex, sexual orientation," etc. . . . . § 6720(a)(8) (Federal Payments; Definitions, Application, and Administration) • 34 U.S.C. § 10228(c . . . of Federal Control Over State and Local Criminal Justice Agencies; Prohibition of Discrimination) • 34 . . . U.S.C. § 11133(a)(16) (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; State Plans) • 34 U.S.C. § 12161 . . . (g) (Community Schools Youth Services and Supervision Grant Program) • 34 U.S.C. § 12361 (Violent Crime . . . Provisions) • 34 U.S.C. § 50104(a) (Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance) • 36 U.S.C. § 20204 . . .

UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, v. COWPASTURE RIVER PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION LLC, v., 140 S. Ct. 1837 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . § 1244(a)(1), the Secretary of the Interior delegated that duty to the National Park Service, 34 Fed . . . of Interior delegated his authority over the Appalachian Trail to the National Park Service in 1969. 34 . . . the Department of the Interior delegated those responsibilities to the National Park Service in 1969. 34 . . . Again, it was after the Park Service had become the Trail's "land administering bureau," 34 Fed. . . . Trail for scenic, historic, cultural, and recreational purposes. §§ 3(b), 5(a)(1), 82 Stat. 919-920; 34 . . .

ROGERS, v. GREWAL,, 140 S. Ct. 1865 (U.S. 2020)

. . . .); but see id. , at 34-35 (Lacy, J., dissenting). . . .

J. LOMAX, v. ORTIZ- MARQUEZ,, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Hernandez , 504 U.S. 25, 34, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992). . . . dismissed with a strike"); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27-28 (similar); Tr. of Oral Arg. 32-34 . . .

GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS, CORP. SAS, v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC,, 140 S. Ct. 1637 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 34-35 (citing, e.g., Chan v. . . .

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC, LLC, III v. LLC, v. LLC, n De De La El Y v., 140 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. 2020)

. . . . §§ 25, 34, 37, id. , at 958, 962, 964. . . . Carter , 409 U.S. 418, 431-432, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973) ("From the moment of their creation . . .

LUCKY BRAND DUNGAREES, INC. v. MARCEL FASHIONS GROUP, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1589 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Counterclaims to Plaintiffs' Complaint in No. 1:05-cv-06757 (SDNY), Doc. 40-2, p. 39; see id. , at 34 . . .

KELLY, v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 1565 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id., at 34. But that realignment was a quintessential exercise of regulatory power. . . .

MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS, v. UNITED STATES v. v. v., 140 S. Ct. 1308 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Id. , at 512, 34 S.Ct. 664. . . . Id., at 514-515, 34 S.Ct. 664 (quoting Minis v. . . . Langston , 118 U.S. at 394, 6 S.Ct. 1185 ; see also Vulte , 233 U.S. at 515, 34 S.Ct. 664. . . . Vulte , 233 U.S. at 514, 34 S.Ct. 664. . . . Vulte , 233 U.S. at 515, 34 S.Ct. 664. . . .

GEORGIA, v. PUBLIC. RESOURCE. ORG, INC., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Code Revision Comm'n , 244 Ga. 325, 330, 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1979). . . . Harrison Co. , 244 Ga. at 330, 260 S.E.2d at 34 (emphasis added). . . . is under Georgia law an act of "legislative authority," Harrison Co. , 244 Ga. at 330, 260 S.E.2d at 34 . . . Compare, e.g. , OCGA § 34-9-260 (annotation for Cho Carwash Property, L.L.C. v. . . . Code Ann. § 34-9-260 (Westlaw's annotation for the same). . . .

COUNTY OF MAUI, HAWAII, v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND,, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (U.S. 2020)

. . . See Brief for State of West Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae 27-34. . . .

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, v. A. CHRISTIAN,, 140 S. Ct. 1335 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Malone, The Battle for Butte 34 (1981). "It was hot. It was dirty. It was dangerous. . . .

RAMOS, v. LOUISIANA, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Code § 35-34-1-1(a) (2019) ; Iowa Ct. Rule 2.5 (2020); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3201 (2007); Md. Crim. . . .

CITGO ASPHALT REFINING COMPANY, v. FRESCATI SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., 140 S. Ct. 1081 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Lorraine Corp. , 633 F.2d 34, 43 (CA7 1980) ("Whether a seller affirmed a fact or made a promise amounting . . .

GUERRERO- LASPRILLA, v. P. BARR, v. P., 140 S. Ct. 1062 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Day , 232 U.S. 110, 116, 34 S.Ct. 233, 58 L.Ed. 528 (1914) (distinguishing between "a mere question of . . .

GUEDES, v. BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES,, 140 S. Ct. 789 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Hudson , 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) ). . . .

SHULAR, v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 779 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Holder , 557 U.S. 29, 33-34, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009). . . .

L. BALDWIN, Et Ux. v. UNITED STATES, 140 S. Ct. 690 (U.S. 2020)

. . . Cameron , 137 U.S. 542, 552, 11 S.Ct. 174, 34 L.Ed. 772 (1890). . . .

WOLF, v. COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS,, 140 S. Ct. 681 (U.S. 2020)

. . . unquestionable focus was the scope of that injunction: Its stay application used the word "nationwide" 34 . . .

THOMPSON, v. HEBDON,, 140 S. Ct. 348 (U.S. 2019)

. . . McKee , 649 F.3d 34, 60-61 (C.A.1 2011) ; Ognibene v. . . .

MARAVELIAS, v. DEPAMPHILIS, 140 S. Ct. 204 (U.S. 2019)

. . . David DEPAMPHILIS No. 19-34 Supreme Court of the United States. . . .

UNITED STATES, v. ROMERO, Jr., 935 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . I at 33-34. . . .

WATTS, v. WATTS,, 935 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Br. at 33-34 (emphasis omitted). Shane's argument has two parts. . . .

ALLERGAN SALES, LLC, v. SANDOZ, INC., 935 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Griffin , 285 F.3d at 1033-34. . . . See Appellant's Br. 34 ("The district court's preliminary injunction decision rises and falls with its . . .

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR, v., 935 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Evans , 514 U.S. 1, 4, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) ; Herring , 555 U.S. at 137, 129 S.Ct. 695 . . . Br. of Appellee at 34 (emphasis added) (Taylor); see also Br. of Appellee at 29 (Smith). . . .

UNITED STATES v. LILLARD,, 935 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Massachusetts , 308 U.S. 79, 83, 60 S.Ct. 34, 84 L.Ed. 93 (1939) ). . . . The district court sentenced Lillard to 34 months imprisonment and ordered him to pay $ 79,130.55 in . . .

UNITED STATES v. HERRING,, 935 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Appx. at 34. . . . Appx. at 34. . . . Appx. at 34. . . . Herring also alleged that he expected his attorney to "advise him regarding appeals," id. at 34-35, but . . .

TIMS, v. LGE COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION,, 935 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 59,033 -34. . . .

SCHINK, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 935 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32, 34 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter . . .

F. SHARPE, v. UNITED STATES,, 935 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . (quoting Administrative R. at 34, J.A. 890). The next day, Mr. . . .

SINGH, v. P. BARR,, 935 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . P. 34(a)(2). The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. . . .

UNITED STATES v. TOWN OF COLORADO CITY,, 935 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . the Church), it sued the Towns pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34 . . . Whether the district court correctly interpreted 34 U.S.C. § 12601 is a legal question that we review . . . ANALYSIS I. 34 U.S.C. § 12601 The principal dispute in this case concerns the proper interpretation of . . . 34 U.S.C. § 12601. . . . , privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." 34 . . .

IN RE BOWLES,, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . See id. at 232-34. . . .

SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL- DENVER, INC. v. M. AZAR II, U. S., 391 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2019)

. . . Mem. at 34; see also S1-AR at 54 (2010 PRRB Decision at 8). . . .

CHAMBERLAIN GROUP, INC. v. TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES CO. OWT ET Co., 935 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . other than merely opening and closing a corresponding movable barrier." '275 patent at col. 1, ll. 31-34 . . . Id. at col. 1, ll. 34-38. . . .

NICHOLSON J. H. a J. N. G. a v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES a a, 935 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Guess , 137 F.3d 1126, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 1998), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized . . .

COMPERE, v. NUSRET MIAMI, LLC, d b a a, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (S.D. Fla. 2019)

. . . Defendant's Reply in Support of its Partial Motion to Dismiss ("Reply to Mot. to Dismiss") (ECF No 34 . . .

DIVERSE POWER, INC. v. CITY OF LAGRANGE, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . City of Eau Claire , 471 U.S. 34, 42, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 1718, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985). . . . O.C.G.A. § 36-34-5(a)(1). . . . "power[ ] specifically granted to [LaGrange] by law" here is the power authorized by O.C.G.A. § 36-34 . . . in O.C.G.A. § 36-65-2 (the immunity statute) refers here to the powers authorized in O.C.G.A. § 36-34 . . . And the immunity granted by O.C.G.A. § 36-34-5(a)(3) -in conjunction with O.C.G.A. § 36-65-2 -is only . . .

UNITED STATES v. A. HOPPER,, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Based on a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I, the PSR calculated a guidelines . . . Hopper's base offense level falls to 34. . . . At a base offense level of 34, applying the two-level drug premises enhancement, Mr. . . . Appellant's Br. 34. R.32 at 1. Appellant's Br. 36. See, e.g. , United States v. Hardimon , 329 F. . . .

WOLFINGTON, v. RECONSTRUCTIVE ORTHOPAEDIC ASSOCIATES II PC, a k a, 935 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 333-34. . . . Id. at 333-34. Id. Flender Corp. v. Tippins Int'l, Inc. , 830 A.2d 1279, 1284 (Pa. Super. . . . Appellant Br. at 34. . . .

BACA v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF STATE, G. T. L. M., 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Neagle , 135 U.S. 1, 63-64, 10 S.Ct. 658, 34 L.Ed. 55 (1890) ); see also U.S. Const. art. . . .

BURKE, v. REGALADO, v., 935 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3550 (3d ed. 2008); see In re United States , 158 F.3d 26, 34 . . .

UNITED STATES v. SHAYOTA, v., 934 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . See Henry Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence 34 (1761) ("[I]f the Witnesses examined on a Coroner's Inquest . . . Angell , 11 F. 34, 43 (C.C.D. . . .

UNITED STATES v. STAHLMAN,, 934 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1277 n.34 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). . . .

BOWLES, v. DESANTIS,, 934 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . See supra at 1233-34. . . . Ct. 1112, 1133-34, 203 L.Ed.2d 521 (2019) (lamenting that the State's "interests have been frustrated . . .

GUPTA, v. MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY, LLC,, 934 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Hotchkiss , 231 U.S. 50, 34 S.Ct. 20, 58 L.Ed. 115 (1913). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CANO,, 934 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) (searches incident to arrest), overruled . . . Id. at 533-34, 105 S.Ct. 3304. . . .

ANZA TECHNOLOGY, INC. v. MUSHKIN, INC., 934 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Adamar of N.J., Inc. , 34 F.3d 1173, 1177 (3d Cir. 1994). . . .

SENNE v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP. LLC LLC LP St. LLC LLC LLC LLC L. P. L. P. LLC LLC L. P. AZPB L. P. P LLC LLC LP LLP LLC LLC,, 934 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Behrend , 569 U.S. 27, 34, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation . . . McCann , 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 378, 225 P.3d at 533-34 (alterations and citations omitted) (emphasis added) . . . Rule 23(b)(3), no such requirement exists under 23(b)(2)."); see also 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 4:34 . . . Op. at 933-34, the California Supreme Court walked through each of the steps of the governmental interest . . .

UNITED STATES v. EUGENE,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 225 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . applicable sentencing guideline range would have been 262-327 months based on a total offense level of 34 . . .

LEWIS, v. CITY OF UNION CITY, GEORGIA,, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019)

. . . Silverman , 637 F.3d at 733-34 (quotations omitted). Here, Ms. . . .

NALPROPION PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. v. ACTAVIS LABORATORIES FL, INC., 934 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. 143, 202 L.Ed.2d 34 (2018) ). . . .

UNITED STATES v. FELICIANOSOTO,, 934 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . sustaining Felicianosoto's drug-quantity objection, the district court calculated a total offense level of 34 . . .

FLORES, v. P. BARR, K. U. S. U. S. U. S., 934 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . phrase "safe and sanitary" is so vague that either it cannot be enforced, see Oral Argument at 33:57-34 . . .

JIE FANG Li v. DIRECTOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 935 F.3d 172 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at 433-34 (citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3.1 (1989)). . . .

HAWKINS v. I- TV DIGITALIS TAVKOZLESI ZRT. f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V. v. i- TV f k a DMCC Rt. DIGI RCS RDS S. A. RCS S. A. DIGI N. V., 935 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 2019)

. . . Lane Walker Rudkin, Ltd. , 869 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that personal jurisdiction over alleged . . .

UNITED STATES v. G. WAGUESPACK,, 935 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Richardson , 713 F.3d 232, 233-34 (5th Cir. 2013). . . .

DEJORIA, v. MAGHREB PETROLEUM EXPLORATION, S. A., 935 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . For a list of the 34 jurisdictions that have enacted the 1962 version, see Foreign Money Judgments Act . . .

ZEHENTBAUER FAMILY LAND, LP LP v. CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L. L. C. L. L. C. E P USA,, 935 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Behrend , 569 U.S. 27, 34, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013) (quoting Amchem , 521 U.S. at 615, . . . but " Rule 23(b)(3) 's predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a)." 569 U.S. at 34 . . . are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.' " Id. at 34 . . . Id. at 33-34, 133 S.Ct. 1426 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). . . . Id. at 34, 133 S.Ct. 1426 ; see also Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK,, 935 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), quoting United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. SCANZANI,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 210 (D. Mass. 2019)

. . . Investigations ("HSI") Special Agent Jason Defreitas reviewed the report, which consisted of approximately 34 . . . In his affidavit, Defreitas attested that the RemoteCOM report "consist[ed] of approximately 34 pdf documents . . . In the file titled CumulativeDetail-34.pdf is an image denoted DSC_0051 of a naked infant boy approximately . . .

SANOFI- AVENTIS U. S. LLC, IP, v. DR. REDDY S LABORATORIES, INC. Dr. s USA, LLC, LLC, LLC,, 933 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Decision , slip op. at 34. . . . Decision , slip op. at 34. . . . Decision , slip op. at 34-35. U.S. . . . Decision , slip op. at 34. . . .

CHABAD LUBAVITCH OF LITCHFIELD COUNTY, INC. v. LITCHFIELD HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION,, 934 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Id. at *34. . . .

JEFFERIES, v. UNC REGIONAL PHYSICIANS PEDIATRICS, 392 F. Supp. 3d 620 (M.D.N.C. 2019)

. . . (Doc. 23-3 ¶¶ 12, 15-17; Doc. 25-22 at 4; Doc. 23-1 at 14-15; Doc. 23-2 at 34.) . . .

UNITED STATES v. NEJAD,, 933 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Ct. at 1632-34. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BLAIR,, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . Miller , 665 F.3d 114, 133-34 (5th Cir. 2011) ; United States v. Love , 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. . . .

LATURNER, v. UNITED STATES,, 933 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . Parnell , 352 U.S. 29, 34, 77 S.Ct. 119, 1 L.Ed.2d 93 (1956) ), and a state may not "fail[ ] to give . . .

GREYER, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, v., 933 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . REV. 1555, 1633-34 & nn. 269-70 (2003) (citing Porter v. . . . O'Brien , 216 F.3d 626, 633-34 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "if a case is properly filed as an action . . .

EFFEX CAPITAL, LLC, v. NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION,, 933 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 93-975, at 34-38 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1131, at 18-19 (1974). . . .

OWNER OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC. L. B. L. LLC G. v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION S. PTC K. PTC T. PTC T. Sr. PTC N. PTC P. PTC R. PTC s, 934 F.3d 283 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . Duff, 793 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. . . .

RAM REZ- P REZ, v. P. BARR,, 934 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2019)

. . . Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016) ). . . .

IN RE ASCOT FUND LIMITED, a, 603 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)

. . . (Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 34-35; Exs. 6 & 7.) . . . (Ex. 2 at ¶¶ 12, 14, 34, 35.) . . . (Id. at ¶¶ 34, 46.) . . .

UNITED STATES v. SAINZ,, 933 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Greer , 481 U.S. 129, 131-34, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) ). . . . Burke , 504 U.S. 229, 246, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds . . .

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS, INC. v. MANGAN, G. J., 933 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . McKee , 649 F.3d 34, 54 (1st Cir. 2011). . . .

YOUNG, v. PFEIFFER,, 933 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . P. 34(a)(2). . . .

HARDEMAN, v. CURRAN,, 933 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2019)

. . . Pineiro , 849 F.3d 17, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2017) (conditions of confinement generally); Castro v. . . .

RSUI INDEMNITY COMPANY, v. NEW HORIZON KIDS QUEST, INC., 933 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp.2d 1029, 1033-34 (D. Minn. 2013). . . .

DINAPLES, v. MRS BPO, LLC MRS BPO, LLC,, 934 F.3d 275 (3rd Cir. 2019)

. . . MRS Br. 34. . . .

STUDDARD, v. SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, J. I., 934 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Studdard faced the officers to the west, about 34 feet away. . . . And Officers Reed and Shepherd, in the southbound lane of the road, stood about 34 feet from Studdard . . . suspects made similar movements toward the officers just before being shot-one swaying forward from 34 . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLOSE,, 931 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 34) is GRANTED . The mandate is withdrawn. . . .

UNITED STATES v. JOBE,, 933 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . Artis , 919 F.3d 1123, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2019) ; United States v. . . .

UNITED STATES v. R. PAUP,, 933 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2019)

. . . P. 34(f) ; 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. . . . Id. at 633-34. . . .

ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, v. HOSPIRA, INC. v. Dr. s Dr. s, 933 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2019)

. . . See Warner-Jenkinson , 520 U.S. at 34, 117 S.Ct. 1040. . . . the derivatives described in the Akimoto patent are preferred examples of antifolates, id. col. 4 ll. 34 . . .

IN RE FIFTH AVENUE AND RELATED PROPERTIES, 934 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Evans , 514 U.S. 1, 10, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) ). . . . In re 650 Fifth Ave. , No. 08 Civ. 10934 (KBF), 2017 WL 2062983, at *23 n.34. . . . source before December 2008); 33 (also received from the confidential source prior to December 2008); 34 . . .

KIRSCHENBAUM, v. ASSA CORPORATION, Co., 934 F.3d 191 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Inc. , 409 F.3d 26, 34 (2d Cir. 2005). . . . See id. at 133-34. . . .

DUPREE, v. FAY SERVICING, LLC, LLC,, 392 F. Supp. 3d 639 (E.D. Va. 2019)

. . . . ¶¶ 31, 34-38. . . . Id. ¶ 34. . . . Id. ¶¶ 31, 34-38. . . . mortgage regulations, which regulations Plaintiff asserts that Fay Servicing violated, see Compl. ¶¶ 31, 34 . . .

EHRMAN, v. COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. COXCOM, LLC LLC,, 932 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . No. 109-14, at 35 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34. . . . Ct. 1743, 1751, 204 L.Ed.2d 34 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting), federal diversity jurisdiction provides . . .

BAKALIAN v. CENTRAL BANK OF REPUBLIC OF TURKEY T. C. v. T. C. v. T. C. v. T. C., 932 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . of War: Reports of Majority and Dissenting Reports of American and Japanese Members, annex I at 30, 34 . . .

PATEL, v. FACEBOOK, INC., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019)

. . . United States , 533 U.S. 27, 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) ("[I]n the case of the search . . . These concerns extend to sense-enhancing thermal imaging, see Kyllo , 533 U.S. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038 . . .

SIEGEL, s s v. HSBC NORTH AMERICA HOLDINGS, INC. HSBC USA, N. A. HBUS,, 933 F.3d 217 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Supp. 3d 722, 733-34 (N.D. Ill. 2017). . . . See, e.g. , TAC ¶¶ 34-35 (identifying various public reports that ARB and some of its senior officials . . .

UNITED STATES v. HEGWOOD,, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019)

. . . Under the career-offender guideline his offense level was 34, which, after subtracting the three levels . . .

P. DYER, v. VENTRA SANDUSKY, LLC,, 934 F.3d 472 (6th Cir. 2019)

. . . Dyer Dep. at 34-37. . . .