Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The circuit court considered McDougall's claim and reviewed chapter 95-514, Laws of Florida, and chapter 30, Florida Statutes (1997). The circuit court concluded that the procedures followed by the civil service board violated Van House's due process rights for two primary reasons: the procedures set forth in section 30.076, Florida Statutes (1997), should have been followed by the civil service board rather than the procedures set forth in chapter 95-514, Laws of Florida; and McDougall should have been required to prove just cause for the suspension....

...sheriff shall establish a review board to review, pursuant to appeals taken under ss. 30.071-30.079, terminations taken by the sheriff against regularly appointed deputy sheriffs for lawful off-duty political activity or for discriminatory reasons." Section 30.076(1) specifies that "[t]he sheriff may not terminate a regularly appointed deputy sheriff for exercising lawful off-duty political rights." Section 30.076(2) states that "[t]he review board shall be *121 utilized to make the determination as to whether or not the termination of a deputy sheriff was politically or discriminatorily motivated." The circuit court determined that chapter 95-5...

...only for just cause, while chapter 30 establishes a lesser standard. Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that the civil service board erred by not requiring McDougall to prove just cause and by otherwise failing to follow certain provisions of section 30.076....

...In determining that the civil service board should have adhered to the requirements and followed the procedures contained in chapter 30, the circuit court did not adequately take into account the limitation language contained in sections 30.075 and 30.076....

...Petition granted. CASANUEVA, C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., Concur. . We do not find merit in the other issues raised by Falk in her petition. . Although the circuit court was correct in determining that the Sheriff had the burden of proof, it erroneously relied on section 30.076, Florida Statutes (2007), which involves the termination of a deputy sheriff that was politically or discriminatorily motivated....

...After being terminated from his position as a captain with the St. Lucie County Sheriffs Office, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Sheriffs Office to either reinstate him or afford him a hearing before the review board, pursuant to section 30.076(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2010)....

...firmed where trial court is right for the wrong reason). Collectively, sections 30.071 through 30.079, Florida Statutes (2010), govern the Sheriffs power to appoint deputies and limit the Sherriffs power to terminate deputies. Sections 30.073(5) and 30.076(1) prohibit the termination of a deputy sheriff for lawful off-duty political activity or for a discriminatory reason. Section 30.076 affords a terminated deputy the right to a hearing before a review board to challenge his termination and gives the board the authority to determine whether the termination was “politically or diseriminatorily motivated.” See § 30.076(2), Fla....

...view was not meaningful. The Court likewise disagrees with Lopez's final point, that the denial of counsel and cross-examination at the CSAB hearing violate Florida law. Lopez complains that the CSAB's procedures failed to adhere to Florida Statutes § 30.076's due process guarantees. (Doc. 50, pp. 13-15). However, § 30.076 does not apply to Lopez's appeal of his demotion and suspension. Section 30.076(1) guarantees a deputy sheriff facing termination , among other things, the right to cross-examine witnesses testifying against them and the right to counsel at termination appeals hearings. Section 30.076(1) applies only to appeals of terminations, not demotions. Lopez attempts to bridge this gap by insisting that § 30.076 applies to terminations of promotions as well as normal terminations, relying on an unrelated subsection of another statute, § 30.073(3). (Doc. 50, p. 14). Lopez's importation of the broad "termination" definition from § 30.073(3) to avail himself of § 30.076's robust due process guarantees defies basic statutory construction. 13 Therefore, Lopez's argument that the CSAB procedures violated his due process rights guaranteed by § 30.076 fails....