RULE 3.830. DIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT

A criminal contempt may be punished summarily only if the
court saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt
committed in the actual presence of the court. The court shall
strictly comply with the following five procedural requirements.

(a) Prior to the adjudication of guilt the judge shall inform
the defendant of the accusation against the defendant and inquire
as to whether the defendant has any cause to show why he or she
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt by the court and
sentenced therefor.

(b) The court shall provide the defendant the opportunity to
present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances.

(c) The judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital
of those facts on which the adjudication of guilt is based, and
confirm compliance with the five procedural requirements of this
rule.

(d) The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered of
record.

(e) Sentence shall be pronounced in open court.

If necessary to ensure safety of individuals in the courtroom,
the court may order the defendant be temporarily detained and
removed from the courtroom; however once the danger to
individuals in the courtroom has abated, the defendant should be
returned to the courtroom to allow for the procedures set forth in
this rule.
Committee Notes

1968 Adoption. This proposal is consistent with present
Florida practice in authorizing summary proceedings in direct
criminal contempt cases. See Ballengee v. State, 144 So. 2d 68 (Fla.
2d DCA 1962); Baumgartner v. Joughin, 105 Fla. 334, 141 So. 185
(1932); also see State v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930),
holding that the defendant is not entitled to notice of the accusation
or a motion for attachment. Fairness dictates that the defendant be
allowed to present excusing or mitigating evidence even in direct
criminal contempt cases.

Much of the terminology of the proposal is patterned after
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) with variations for
purposes of clarity. What may be considered a significant change
from the terminology of the federal rule is that the proposal
provides for a “judgment” of contempt, whereas the term “order” of
contempt is used in the federal rule. Both terms have been used in
Florida appellate cases. The term “judgment” is preferred here since
it is consistent with the procedure of adjudicating guilt and is more
easily reconciled with a “conviction” of contempt, common
terminology on the trial and appellate levels in Florida. It also is
consistent with appeals in contempt cases. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Shotkin v. Buchanan, 149 So. 2d 574, 98 A.L.R.2d 683 (Fla. 3d DCA
1963), for the use of the term “judgment”.

1972 Amendment. Same as prior rule.