The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . Law § 330.30, the trial court declined to grant such relief in light of two prior adjournments of sentence . . .
. . . Hughes filed a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 330.30 . . . The Albany County Supreme Court denied his § 330.30 motion on May 22, 2012, and on June 5, 2012 the trial . . . "remaining arguments were not preserved for our review ... and their inclusion in his posttrial CPL 330.30 . . . address, and which were raised for the first time in petitioner's posttrial motion pursuant to CPL § 330.30 . . . among those "remaining arguments" was Hughes's ex post facto argument, which he pressed in his CPL § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30 motion to vacate, and denied the adjournment request, noting that it was counsel’s third sentencing . . . adjournment request and admonishing counsel that C.P.L. § 330.30 relief requires a formal, written motion . . .
. . . Law § 330.30 on the grounds of, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 6. . . .
. . . State Supreme Court, Kings County, to set aside the verdict under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30 alleging jury misconduct and that prosecution witness Greg San Filippo had erroneously testified . . . denied the motion as premature and held that two of the issues had been raised, and denied, in the § 330.30 . . .
. . . s failure to file a post-verdict motion for legal insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to section 330.30 . . . because he failed to make a post-verdict motion for legal insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to CPL 330.30 . . . because he failed to make a post-verdict motion for legal insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to CPL 330.30 . . .
. . . In an order dated June 29, 2009, the County Court denied the Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 motion, . . . of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court.’ ” {Id., citing Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . discrepancy; and did not become aware of these inaccuracies until Green filed his Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . erred in holding that it did not have the discretion to entertain Green’s Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30(1). . . .
. . . LaFache, Martinez filed a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 330.30 . . . The trial court denied the § 330.30 motion on March 3, 2004, finding no proof that Moran used methamphetamine . . .
. . . to sentencing, Harris moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . Following an unsuccessful motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedural Law § 330.30 . . . (“ § 330.30”), Ochoa appealed to the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Judicial . . . The Court is persuaded by the Trial Court’s decision and order denying Ochoa’s § 330.30 motion to set . . .
. . . Law § 330.30.) . . .
. . . . § 330.30 to set aside the verdict on the basis that the trial court had erroneously precluded the third-party . . . Fourth Department, of New York State Supreme Court on the same ground as he had advanced in his C.P.L. § 330.30 . . .
. . . and the trial court’s specific determination of, the issues brought by this defendant’s pro-se CPL 330.30 . . . C.P.L. § 330.30 provides that “[a]t any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence . . . Law § 330.30(1). . . . . § 330.30, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective assistance on numerous bases; that his confession . . . Thus, defendant was not entitled to the assignment of new counsel for the [C.P.L. § 330.30] motion[.] . . .
. . . . § 330.30 Motion to Set Aside the Verdict Represented by new counsel, Young moved pursuant to C.P.L. . . . § 330.30 to set aside the verdict on the basis that the “[fjailure to allow Dr. . . . office had referred, in passing, to the “right to present a defense” argument in drafting the C.P.L. 330.30 . . .
. . . Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, pursuant to CPL 330.30. . . .
. . . additional time in order to determine whether a motion to set aside the verdict for juror bias under CPL § 330.30 . . . Tr. at 3 ("I did not formally make a 330.30 motion at this time because the material I’ve received thus . . .
. . . . § 330.30(1). . . . . § 330.30. Pet’r Reply Mem. at 10-11. . . . . § 330.30 provides a vehicle for moving to set aside or modify the verdict, in whole or in part, on . . . Law § 330.30(1). . . . 2000) (“Brock also asserts as a ground for habeas relief that the trial court’s denial of his CPL § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30. As respondent argues, this claim was not raised previously. . . .
. . . . § 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict. . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdicts. . . .
. . . sentencing, the petitioner moved to set aside his conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . erred when it denied his motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . and the trial court’s specific determination of, the issues brought by this defendant’s pro-se CPL 330.30 . . . C.P.L. § 330.30 provides that “[a]t any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence . . . Law § 330.30(1). . . . . § 330.30, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective assistance on numerous bases; that his confession . . . Thus, defendant was not entitled to the assignment of new counsel for the [C.P.L. § 330.30] motion[.] . . .
. . . .”) §§ 330.30, 330.40, and 330.50, asking the trial court to set aside the jury’s verdict. . . . First, petitioner argued that the verdict should be set aside pursuant to C.P.L. § 330.30(1) because . . . Clohessy Affidavit in Support of C.P.L. § 330.30 Motion, ¶ 19. . . . Ground Five: Erroneous Denial of C.P.L. § 330.30 Motion Based On Newly Discovered Evidence (Errors by . . . Law] 330.30(3)). . . .
. . . . § 330.30. . . . (citing Affidavit of Juror Jean McCarthy, submitted in connection with the C.P.L. § 330.30 motion). . . . C.P.L. § 330.30 provides that "[a]t any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence . . . L. § 330.30(l)-(3). . Citations to "S__” refer to pages of the sentencing hearing transcript. . . . .
. . . requests included — in the order Mohsin filed them — a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to Section 330.30 . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30, the trial court granted a new trial, holding that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor . . . , “the trial court was not warranted in granting the motion to vacate the conviction under C.P.L. § 330.30 . . . misconduct, it had not denied him of a fair trial as a matter of law, making reversal under C.P.L. § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30 presentence motion to vacate the jury verdict, which the trial court refused to entertain . . . raised his claims regarding jury selection in a post-verdict motion filed pro se pursuant to C.P.L. § 330.30 . . .
. . . See C.P.L. § 330.30 Motion filed 4/10/02, submitted as part of the record on appeal (Resp’t Ex. . . . Law § 330.30. However, the trial court did order a hearing pursuant to People v. . . . The trial court denied the second C.P.L. § 330.30 motion in an order dated July 5, 2002, finding that . . . Law § 330.30(3). . . . . . § 330.30 hearing that he had subpoenaed her. See Resp't Ex. H at 10-11. . In People v. . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30 to aside the verdict on the basis of newly discovered evidence — namely, evidence from a . . . Defense counsel conceded during oral argument on the C.P.L. § 330.30 motion that Elliott was known to . . . of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, that the trial court erroneously denied his C.P.L. § 330.30 . . . Law § 330.30(3); other citations omitted). . . . that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing with regard to his post-verdict C.P.L. § 330.30 . . .
. . . November 5, 2003, Fernandez moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . , 97 N.Y.2d 56, 61, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329 (2001) (on a post-verdict motion pursuant to § 330.30 . . . This is precisely the claim that Fernandez advanced in his § 330.30 post-verdict motion, on appeal to . . .
. . . . § 330.30 to set aside the verdict on the basis that the prosecutor made improper comments during summation . . . Campbell had previously raised that issue in a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to C.P.L. § 330.30 . . . Then, counsel at sentencing asserted a claim of prosecutorial misconduct in support of the C.P.L. § 330.30 . . .
. . . Law § 330.30. Defense counsel argued that, in line with Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89 (2d. . . . Law § 330.30 motion was too late to preserve the issue for appellate review). . . . The defense argued at the § 330.30 hearing, and on appeal, that the Second Circuit case Leka v. . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30. . . .
. . . trial court to vacate his judgment of conviction under New York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) § 330.30 . . . He also moved, on January 20, 1989, to vacate the judgment pursuant to NYCPL § 330.30(3) based on his . . . Because Diaz’s § 330.30(1)(2) motion “added no new fact or law” that was not raised in trial proceedings . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30, arguing that the court’s answers to the jury’s questions were erroneous, thereby infecting . . .
. . . Law 330.30 on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence. (See Resp’t Ex. A at A-12 to 13.) . . . . 2254(d), or, even if it satisfies this standard, whether the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30); and on a motion to vacate the conviction (N.Y.C.P.L. § 440.10). . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30 on the ground that the prosecutor had violated his discovery obligations under New York . . . Erroneous denial of petitioner’s C.P.L. § 330.30 motion Prior to sentencing, Goston moved to set aside . . . the verdict pursuant to C.P.L. § 330.30(1) on the basis that the prosecution committed a so-called “ . . . Presented with Goston’s post-verdict C.P.L. § 330.30 motion raising the Rosario issue, the trial court . . .
. . . . § 330.30 based on affidavits from Jones and her daughter, Holloman, which McCullough argued constituted . . . The trial court denied McCullough’s C.P.L. § 330.30 motion and set the matter for sentencing. . . . by Jones and Holloman did not constitute “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of C.P.L. § 330.30 . . . Law § 330.30(3) (citations omitted)). Leave to appeal was denied by the New York Court of Appeals. . . .
. . . counsel, Williams brought a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . of belief; and (2) that since his co-defendant was released on a New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . Law § 330.30(3), to set aside Rojas’s verdict based on the discovery of new evidence after trial. . . . Counsel noted that Rojas had previously made a section 330.30 motion based on a statement by Guerrero . . . The Merits The record and the material contained in the section 330.30 motion of Rojas reveal the meritlessness . . . Rojas is the more understandable in view of the facts that were brought to light in Rojas’s section 330.30 . . .
. . . On December 18, 1998, petitioner moved pro se to set aside the verdict, pursuant to section 330.30 of . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30 to set aside the verdict on the ground that he was not provided with certain Rosario material . . . conviction became final by including it as a basis for motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to C.P.L. § 330.30 . . .
. . . thereafter brought a motion, through counsel and pro se, to set aside the verdict pursuant to section 330.30 . . . New York Criminal Procedure Law section 330.30 provides in pertinent part that ”[a]t any time after rendition . . .
. . . The court noted that Wells had appealed its denial of his 330.30 motion presenting the same ineffective . . . Judge Gary wrote that, if the 330.30 motion were not pending on appeal, he would deny the 440.10 motion . . . just as he had denied the 330.30 motion. 3 Wells then appealed his conviction and the denial of both . . . On October 25, 1999, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and denial of the 330.30 motion, . . . Law § 330.30. . . . .
. . . . § 330.30; he supported them with an affidavit from juror Caroline Lewis. . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30 to set aside the verdict, but this motion was denied. . . .
. . . standard of proof to insanity acquittees under Jones and that, therefore, his recommitment under CPL § 330.30 . . .
. . . Defense counsel filed a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . .”) § 330.30(3) to set aside the verdict on the ground of newly discovered evidence. . . .
. . . Petitioner moved to set aside his conviction, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30, asserting . . . Law § 330.30(1). . . .
. . . Chief Judge Walker addresses the merits of Sweet's section 330.30 claim and New York’s doctrine of inconsistent . . .
. . . . § 330.30. . . .
. . . . § 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict. See Tantillo Affirmation, App. 1 at 200-01. . . .
. . . In light of this belated discovery, Hill moved pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30(1 . . .
. . . , petitioner moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30 motion without a hearing. See Pet’r App. Div. Br., Ex. L. . . . In the section of his appellate brief which discusses the dismissal of his C.P.L. § 330.30 motion without . . . The three cases upon which counsel grounded his argument relied exclusively on C.P.L. § 330.30. . . . In Phillips, the court observed that although C.P.L. § 330.30 specifies that the defendant has the burden . . . In support of his C.P.L. § 330.30 motion, Bowers offered the affidavits of two jurors which allegedly . . .
. . . On June 3, 1997, Pressley moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL §§ 330.30, 330.40, and 330.50 . . .
. . . Anderson thereafter moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30. . . . .
. . . He has moved pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Section 330.30 to set aside the verdict based on (1), . . .
. . . Petitioner later moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . This tape was submitted with the § 330.30 motion. . . .
. . . . § 330.30, and Montalvo joined the motion. . . .
. . . . § 330.30 for an order setting aside the verdict. . . . Division consolidated Leka’s direct appeal with his appeal from the denial of his motions made under § 330.30 . . .
. . . . §§ 210.40, 330.30(1), 330.40, and 330.50 to set aside the verdict on the ground that the evidence adduced . . .
. . . Jones’ CPL §§ 330.30 and 440.10 Motions On December 6, 1996, represented by-counsel, Jones filed a CPL . . . neighbor would testify that there was no robbery, and that Jones did not have a gun. (12/95 Jones § 330.30 . . . On January 19, 1996, before sentencing Jones, the trial court denied Jones’ CPL § 330.30 motion. (1/19 . . . The court properly denied defendant’s motions made pursuant to CPL 330.30(3) and 440.10(l)(g) on the . . . In order to warrant an evidentiary hearing pursuant to CPL §§ 330.30 and 440.10, a defendant’s moving . . .
. . . First, on January 18, 1982, Petitioner moved, prior to sentencing, pursuant to CPL § 330.30, to set aside . . .
. . . Law § 330.30 to set aside the verdict, and not a § 440.10(1) motion two years after the verdict. . . .
. . . On June 18, 1990, petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the § 330.30 motion. . . . Petition repeated the same claims he advanced in his § 330.30 motion, but he submitted additional newly . . . consolidate that appeal with his direct appeal and his appeal from the trial court’s denial of his § 330.30 . . . Lastly, petitioner challenged the denial without a hearing of his § 330.30 and § 440.10 motions, essentially . . . In none of the three affidavits that he has submitted in support of Leka’s § 330.30 and § 440.10 motions . . .
. . . 11, 1980, Petitioner moved to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 330.30 . . .
. . . the trial was ongoing, but noted that the motion it had in mind was an immediate motion pursuant to § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30. After hearing argument on the motion, the judge denied petitioner’s motion (S.8). . . .
. . . Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30. . . .
. . . Law §§ 330.30 and 440.10, respectively. . . .
. . . November 19, 1990, defense counsel made a written motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL § 330.30 . . . November 19, 1990, defense counsel made a written motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL § 330.30 . . . CPL § 330.30 provides that: At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the . . . CPL § 330.30 provides in pertinent part that At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before . . .
. . . Law § 330.30, Green sought post-conviction relief in two separate motions to set aside the verdict. . . .
. . . .”) §§ 330.30, 330.40 and 330.50, to set aside the jury verdict on a number of grounds that apparently . . .
. . . pro se post-trial motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 330.30 . . .
. . . the petitioner moved for an order, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] §§ 290.10 and 330.30 . . . The § 330.30 motion was grounded on the alleged failure of the People to provide all Rosario and Brady . . .
. . . . § 330.30. The motion was denied on May 18, 1984, and petitioner was sentenced as set forth above. . . .
. . . On March 31, 1982, Bentley filed a motion to set aside the verdict- pursuant to CPL §§ 330.30, 330.40 . . . limitations contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers;, (3) claims raised by petitioner in his CPL § 330.30 . . .
. . . counsel, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . . In his § 330.30 motion to set aside the verdict, petitioner through new counsel requested a Massiah hearing . . .
. . . Smithwick’s counsel moved to set aside the verdict and for a mistrial pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30(1) and (3) on the ground of newly discovered exculpatory evidence. . . .
. . . After the jury verdict, petitioner filed motions pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law §§ 330.30 . . .
. . . . § 330.30. . . .
. . . harmless; however, the licensing and renewal of licensing of airports in Florida is governed by section 330.30 . . .
. . . written, presentence motion, attorneys for petitioner argued to the trial court that pursuant to CPL §§ 330.30 . . . Petitioner’s § 330.30 (1) motion was denied, apparently "[biased upon the totality of the evidence, and . . .
. . . See N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law § 330.30. . See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). .Tr. at 232 (emphasis added). . . .
. . . The Court, however, notes that it is more properly denominated as a motion pursuant to § 330.30. . . . N.Y.Crim.Pro.Law § 330.30 (McKinney 1983) (motion to set aside verdict). . . . Although no separate appeal lies from an order denying a motion pursuant to § 330.30, that determination . . .
. . . the foregoing, the lodestar figure is computed as follows: Pellettieri, Rabstein and Altman McHugh - 330.30 . . .
. . . After trial, respondent moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to §330.30 of the N.Y. Crim. Proc. . . . Section 330.30 provides in pertinent part: “At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before . . . CPL § 330.40 provides that motions to set aside the verdict under CPL § 330.30 must be decided by hearing . . .
. . . petitioners presented their claims in a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to New York Crim.Proc.Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . Law § 330.30) and to dismiss the indictment because of prose-cutorial misconduct (N.Y.Crim.Proc. . . .
. . . Section 330.30 (1) of the N. Y. Crim. Proc. . . .
. . . CPL §§ 330.30(1), 330.50(1), 470.15(2)(a); People v. . . .
. . . counsel failed to move to set aside the guilty verdict pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 330.30 . . .
. . . CPL § 330.30, et seq. . . .
. . . “CONCLUSIONS: Section 330.30(1), Florida Statutes, 1973, provides the basis upon which licensing should . . .
