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Florida Statute 201.23 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 201.23 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XIV
TAXATION AND FINANCE
Chapter 201
EXCISE TAX ON DOCUMENTS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 201.23
201.23 Foreign notes and other written obligations exempt.
(1) There shall be exempt from all excise taxes imposed by this chapter:
(a) All promissory notes, nonnegotiable notes, and other written obligations to pay money bearing date on or after July 1, 1977, if the makers thereof or the obligors thereunder, at the time of the making or execution thereof, are individuals residing outside the United States or business organizations or other persons located outside the United States.
(b) All drafts or bills of exchange drawn upon and, on or after July 1, 1977, accepted by a bank having an office in Florida, which arise out of transactions involving the importation or exportation of goods or the storage of goods abroad, or drawn by banks or bankers in foreign countries or dependencies or insular possessions of the United States for the purpose of furnishing dollar exchange as required by the usages of trade in the respective countries, dependencies, or insular possessions, if at the date of the acceptance of any of the foregoing the drawer of the draft or bill of exchange or the persons for whose benefit the financing is conducted are individuals residing outside the United States or business organizations or other persons located outside the United States.
(c) Any promissory note, nonnegotiable note, or other written obligation to pay money if the note or obligation is executed and delivered outside this state and at the time of its making is secured only by a mortgage, deed of trust, or similar security agreement encumbering real estate located outside this state and if such promissory note, nonnegotiable note, or other written obligation for payment of money is brought into this state for deposit as collateral security under a wholesale warehouse mortgage agreement or for inclusion in a pool of mortgages deposited with a custodian as security for obligations issued by an agency of the United States Government or for inclusion in a pool of mortgages to be serviced for the account of a customer by a mortgage lender licensed or exempt from licensing under part III of chapter 494.
(2) The exemptions provided in this chapter shall not apply:
(a) To mortgages, trust deeds, security agreements, or other evidences of indebtedness relating to the purchase or transfer of real property located in Florida and filed or recorded in the state, which shall be taxable as if they were entered into within this state.
(b) If the purpose of the financing evidenced by any instrument described in paragraph (1)(a) is to finance all or any part of the purchase of real estate located in Florida or personal property for use in Florida. However, the obligee under any such instrument shall be entitled to rely on a written certificate by the makers thereof or the obligors thereunder that no part of the proceeds of such financing is intended for any such purpose.
(c) If, at the date of any instrument described in paragraph (1)(a) or at the date of acceptance of any instrument described in paragraph (1)(b), a majority of the equity securities of any maker of any instrument described in paragraph (1)(a) or of any obligor thereunder, or of any drawer or person for whose benefit the financing referred to in paragraph (1)(b) is conducted, are owned by individuals residing within the United States or business organizations or other persons located within the United States. However, the obligee under or acceptor of any such instrument shall be entitled to rely upon the written certificate of each maker, obligor, or person for whose benefit the financing is conducted, other than an individual, certifying that a majority of its equity securities are not owned by individuals residing within the United States or business organizations or other persons located within the United States.
(3) The provisions of this section shall not be construed so as to impair the obligation of any contract entered into prior to July 1, 1977.
(4)(a) The excise taxes imposed by this chapter shall not apply to the documents, notes, evidences of indebtedness, financing statements, drafts, bills of exchange, or other taxable items dealt with, made, issued, drawn upon, accepted, delivered, shipped, received, signed, executed, assigned, transferred, or sold by or to a banking organization in the conduct of an international banking transaction. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to change the application of paragraph (2)(a).
(b) For purposes of this subsection, the term:
1. “Banking organization” means:
a. A bank organized and existing under the laws of any state;
b. A national bank organized and existing pursuant to the provisions of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. ss. 21 et seq.;
c. An Edge Act corporation organized pursuant to the provisions of s. 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. ss. 611 et seq.;
d. An international bank agency licensed pursuant to the laws of any state;
e. A federal agency licensed pursuant to ss. 4 and 5 of the International Banking Act of 1978;
f. A savings association organized and existing under the laws of any state;
g. A federal association organized and existing pursuant to the provisions of the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. ss. 1461 et seq.; or
h. A Florida export finance corporation organized and existing pursuant to the provisions of part V of chapter 288.
2. “International banking transaction” means:
a. The financing of the exportation from, or the importation into, the United States or between jurisdictions abroad of tangible personal property or services;
b. The financing of the production, preparation, storage, or transportation of tangible personal property or services which are identifiable as being directly and solely for export from, or import into, the United States or between jurisdictions abroad;
c. The financing of contracts, projects, or activities to be performed substantially abroad, except those transactions secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien upon real property located in the state;
d. The receipt of deposits or borrowings or the extensions of credit by an international banking facility, except the loan or deposit of funds secured by mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien upon real property located in the state; or
e. Entering into foreign exchange trading or hedging transactions in connection with the activities described in sub-subparagraph d.
History.s. 1, ch. 77-463; s. 9, ch. 79-350; s. 92, ch. 79-400; s. 5, ch. 80-136; s. 3, ch. 81-179; s. 53, ch. 91-245; s. 34, ch. 2005-280; s. 64, ch. 2009-241.

F.S. 201.23 on Google Scholar

F.S. 201.23 on Casetext

Amendments to 201.23


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 201.23
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 201.23.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

SS GROCERY, INC. v. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE,, 340 F. Supp. 3d 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)

. . . to all 6,975 EBT transactions that were made during the review period, SS Grocery's average is still 201.23% . . .

MIDTVAAGE, v. PORCHES BAHAMAS, LTD., 128 So. 3d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Lender filed a timely motion for rehearing arguing, inter alia, that pursuant to section 201.23 of the . . . Lender argues that, since section 201.23 renders the promissory note exempt from the payment of excise . . . Pursuant to section 201.23, because the subject promissory note was executed by a foreign company, the . . . The statute provides: 201.23 Foreign notes and other written obligations exempt. (1) There shall be exempt . . . note is a foreign note that meets the criteria for exemption from excise taxes pursuant to section 201.23 . . .

BYES, v. J. ASTRUE,, 687 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2012)

. . . Byes is illiterate and limited to sedentary work, he would still be found “not disabled” under rule 201.23 . . .

STAR SCIENTIFIC, INC. v. R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY A R. J. A, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

. . . See '649 patent col.201.23. Dr. . . .

TEIXEIRA, v. J. ASTRUE,, 755 F. Supp. 2d 340 (D. Mass. 2010)

. . . Part 404 Subpart P, App. 2, Table 1, Rules 201.23-201.29. . . .

H. BELL, Jr. v. J. ASTRUE,, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

. . . The ALJ applied Medical-Vocational Rule 201.23 and found plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. at 21.) . . . Rule 201.23 directs a decision of “not disabled” for a claimant who is a younger individual (age 18 through . . . Id., § 201.23. . . .

C. CHARLES, v. J. ASTRUE,, 291 F. App'x 552 (5th Cir. 2008)

. . . full range of sedentary activity, he did not err in using Medical-Vocational Guideline (“Grid Rule”) 201.23 . . . because Appellant could not perform the full range of sedentary activity, he could not rely on Grid Rule 201.23 . . . Instead, the ALJ properly used Grid Rule 201.23 as a frame of reference and relied on the testimony of . . .

GONZALEZ, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 491 F. Supp. 2d 329 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Here, the ALJ erred when applying Grid rule 201.23 to find that plaintiff was not disabled because clearly . . .

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, INC. v. UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,, 391 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.D.C. 2005)

. . . . § 201.23(d). . . .

HENSLEY, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 352 F.3d 353 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . Whether this ease is considered under rule 201.23 (“Illiterate”) or rule 201.24 (limited education), . . . P, App. 2, Tbl. 1, Rules 201.23-201.24. . . .

HENSLEY, v. Jo B. BARNHART,, 334 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . If actually illiterate, Hensley’s claim should have been analyzed under Rule 201.23 and the ALJ should . . . See id. at Rule 201.23. . . . It is true, as the District Court correctly noted, that under Rule 201.23, a claimant aged 18-44, who . . . In the first instance, Rules 201.23 and 201.24 both reference § 201(h), which, in the “sedentary work . . . Thus, while a claimant who fits Rule 201.23’s criteria is still presumed to be “not disabled,” the presumption . . .

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, INC. v. UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,, 226 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D.D.C. 2002)

. . . . § 201.23(a). . . . and the FDA may also still require an applicant to develop a pediatric drug formulation. 21 C.F.R. § 201.23 . . . existing treatments for pediatric patients for one or more of the claimed indications.” 21 C.F.R. § 201.23 . . . injunction to declare that the product is “misbranded or an unapproved new drug or unlicensed biologic.” § 201.23 . . . See 21 C.F.R. § 201.23(c)(3). . . . .

FALCON- CARTAGENA, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,, 21 F. App'x 11 (1st Cir. 2001)

. . . for the full range of (unskilled) sedentary work was not significantly compromised, and, using Rule 201.23 . . .

PANTOJAS, v. S. APFEL,, 87 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . plaintiffs vocational profile and capacity for sedentary work place him within the framework of Rule 201.23 . . .

D. BRADY v. S. APFEL,, 41 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. Tex. 1999)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, §§ 201.23, 201.24, 201.25, 201.26, 201.27, 201.28. . . .

CHAVEZ, v. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 103 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996)

. . . first time in this Circuit we are called upon to address the interpretation of the word “or” in Rule 201.23 . . . P, App. 2, § 201.23. . . . Rule 201.23 applies, inter alia, to those disability claimants with an educational level, described as . . . At issue in this case is the. meaning of the “or” in Rule 201.23’s description of “education.” . . . Rule 201.23 joins two descriptions of educational status with an “or.” . . .

MANNS, v. E. SHALALA,, 888 F. Supp. 470 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . P, Appendix 2, §§ 201.23, 201.24 (1994). . . .

FLECHA, v. E. SHALALA, WGB, 872 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1994)

. . . plaintiffs residual functional capacity for sedentary work corresponds with medical-vocational Rule 201.23 . . . from both parties by this Court on the issue of whether the application of medical-vocational Rule 201.23 . . . As a result, plaintiff argues that since medical-vocational Rule 201.23 requires that the claimant be . . . in English, the fact that she is both illiterate and unable to communicate in English precludes Rule 201.23 . . . Acquiescence Ruling 86-3(5) necessitates the finding that medical-vocational Rule 201.23 applies regardless . . .

X. MAC v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 811 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Pa. 1993)

. . . age, education, past relevant work experience, and residual functional capacity, the AU applied Rule 201.23 . . . Rule 201.23 of this Table commands that a person of claimant's age, education, and previous work experience . . .

PETTYJOHN, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 784 F. Supp. 792 (D. Colo. 1992)

. . . He cites Rule 201.23 of the Medical Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. . . .

J. IRLANDA ORTIZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 955 F.2d 765 (1st Cir. 1991)

. . . Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the Grid), Table No. 1, Rule 201.23, Pt. 404, Subpt. . . .

RIVERA, v. W. SULLIVAN, M. D., 771 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)

. . . was forty-four years and seven months old when she applied for disability benefits, technically Rule 201.23 . . .

WELCHANCE v. R. BOWEN,, 731 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Tenn. 1989)

. . . RULE 201.23 Having determined that substantial evidence within the record supports no other conclusion . . . than that the plaintiff is illiterate and has an unskilled work experience, rule 201.23 must be the . . . Rule 201.23 directs a conclusion of “not disabled” for illiterate persons who are capable of sedentary . . . Likewise, there can be no dispute that prior to October 1987, the plaintiff fell into rule 201.23’s age . . . Accordingly, the court concludes that use of rule 201.23, or any other rule for individuals under age . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 893 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1989)

. . . claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, so that application of Rule 201.23 . . .

FERNANDEZ- SOSA, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 701 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

. . . Using Rule 201.23, Table No. 1 of Appendix 2 and 20 C.F.R. 404.1569, as guidelines, and in concurrence . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 857 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1988)

. . . Moreover, the AU noted that Section 404.1569 of Regulation No. 4, and Rule 201.23, Table No. 1 of Appendix . . .

A. SNYDER, v. R. BOWEN, M. D., 694 F. Supp. 90 (M.D. Pa. 1988)

. . . range of sedentary work as of June 30, 1977, nevertheless pursuant to Section 404.1520(f), and Rules 201.23 . . .

GONZALEZ, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 784 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1986)

. . . The claimant also contends that the Secretary erred by mechanically applying rule 201.23 of the Medical . . . The record indicates that the Secretary relied on Rule 201.23 of the Medical Vocational grids to support . . . Rule 201.23 identifies claimants who (1) range in age from 18-44 years, and (2) are illiterate or unable . . . ALJ based his denial on Rule 201.23 of Table I of Appendix II of Subpart P & I of Regulations Nos. 4 . . .

A. JOHNSON, v. HECKLER,, 744 F.2d 1333 (8th Cir. 1984)

. . . Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 201.23 (1983). . . .

CITY OF NEW YORK, N. Y. S. F. N. Y. S. I II, I, II, III IV, v. M. HECKLER, A. U. S., 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984)

. . . unskilled claimants aged 50 and over granted benefits), with 20 C.F.R. subpart P, app. 2, §§ 201.18, 201.23 . . .

MARTINEZ, Jr. v. M. HECKLER,, 735 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1984)

. . . Martinez argues the AU misapplied Rules 201.23, 201.24 and 201.25 of Appendix 2. . . . Rule 201.23 provides that an individual with Martinez’ physical handicaps who is illiterate or unable . . . Martinez argues that because he is both illiterate and unable to communicate in English, Rule 201.23 . . . The lowest category Rule 201.23 requires that the claimant be illiterate or unable to communicate in . . . illiterate and unable to communicate in English, he does not fall within the criteria set out in Rule 201.23 . . .

M. BELDEN, v. HECKLER,, 586 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ind. 1984)

. . . Section 404.1569 of Regulations No. 4 and Rules 201.23 and 201.24 of Table No. 1, Appendix 2, Subpart . . .

DE PAULA, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 580 F. Supp. 1580 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)

. . . See §§ 201.23 and 201.24, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. . . .

H. VAN HUSS, v. M. HECKLER,, 572 F. Supp. 160 (W.D. Va. 1983)

. . . the evidence before him, and also based upon a directed finding under Regulation § 404.1569 and Rules 201.23 . . .

E. NALLEY, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 575 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ky. 1983)

. . . The Table 1, Rules 201.23 to 201.29 would apply to plaintiff’s age category, “Younger Individual age . . .

GORY, v. SCHWEIKER,, 712 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1983)

. . . Applying Rule 201.23 of Table 1, 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, the ALJ (as did the district court . . . Gory contends that the ALJ erred in applying Rule 201.23 of Table 1 to his disabilities because he claims . . . Therefore, the ALJ and the district court correctly applied Rule 201.23 to find Gory was not disabled . . .

G. HERNANDEZ, v. M. HECKLER,, 704 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1983)

. . . Based on his findings, the ALJ determined that Rule 201.23 of Table 1 applied and directed a conclusion . . . Rule 201.23, found to be applicable here, reads as follows: Table No. 1 - Residual Functional Capacity . . . Work Experience Decision 201.23 Younger Illiterate Unskilled Not individual or unable or None Disabled . . .

MISURACA, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 562 F. Supp. 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)

. . . . §§ 416.1564-1568, and Rule 201.23, Table No. 1 of Appendix 2. . . .

E. OLSEN, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 703 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1983)

. . . Section 404.1569 and Rule 201.23 Table No. 1 of Appendix 2, Sub-part P, Regulations No. 4, direct that . . . non-exertional impairment which would have precluded the use of grids found in Section 404.1569 and Rule 201.23 . . .

SMITH, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 544 F. Supp. 63 (S.D. Ohio 1982)

. . . The AU went on to hold (Tr. 18) that Plaintiff was not disabled, applying Rules 201.26 and 201.23 of . . . the residual capacity to perform sedentary work, and that it was proper for the ALJ to apply Rules 201.23 . . .

P. SHERWIN, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 685 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982)

. . . See Grid, Rules 201.18, 201.23. . . .

BROZ, v. S. SCHWEIKER, a D. HOLMES, v. S. SCHWEIKER, LITTLE, v. S. SCHWEIKER, O. JONES, v. S. SCHWEIKER, SOESBE, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 677 F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982)

. . . ) resulted in a not disabled determination under the grids. 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, App. 2 § 201.23 . . .

L. CARTER, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 535 F. Supp. 195 (S.D. Ill. 1982)

. . . . § 416.913 (1981) and 20 C.F.R., subpart P, Table No. 1 of Appendix 2, Rule 201.23 (hereinafter Appendix . . .

HOGAN, v. S. SCHWEIKER,, 532 F. Supp. 639 (D. Colo. 1982)

. . . RESULT OF SEVERE MEDICALLY DETERMINED IMPAIRMENT(S) Rule_Age Education Previous Work Experience Decision 201.23 . . . claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational factors coincide with all the criteria of Rule(s) 201.23 . . . This error is not material since the ALJ applied rule 201.23 which is applicable to illiterate claimants . . .

MINUTO, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,, 525 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)

. . . Administrative Law Judge denied the claim for benefits, finding that “Regulation 404.1513 and Rule 201.23 . . . He then applied Rule 201.23 of Appendix 2 (finding it relevant in view of Minuto’s age, educational background . . . Though Rule 201.23 of Appendix 2 was applicable to Minuto’s case in light of his age, education and previous . . . The mechanical application of Rule 201.23 was inappropriate in light of the fact that the footnote to . . . was capable of performing some particular job despite his disability, the ALJ simply employed Rule 201.23 . . .

L. WALKER, v. HARRIS,, 504 F. Supp. 806 (D. Kan. 1980)

. . . Based on claimant’s exertional limitations, only Regulation 416.913, Rules 201.23 and 201.18, Table No . . .

GONZALEZ v. HARRIS,, 496 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1980)

. . . The ALJ very mechanically applied Regulation 404.1513, Rule 201.23, table 1 of Appendix 2, Subpart P, . . . Regulation No. 4 and Regulation 416.913, Rule 201.23, table 1 of Appendix 2, Subpart I, Regulation No . . .

BISHOP, In v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 340 F. Supp. 520 (D.N.H. 1972)

. . . . §§ 201.23, 401.10, 37 F.R. 1012-1013 (January 21, 1972). . . .

CARSON v. JOHN R. THOMPSON CO., 111 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Ky. 1953)

. . . sustained were painful and the plaintiff expended in hospital services and Doctor bills and medicines $201.23 . . .

WILLIAM B. KINNEY, JR. v. THE UNITED STATES, 124 Ct. Cl. 142 (Ct. Cl. 1953)

. . . C. 1G/AI 201.23 22 Jul 1948 Subject: Complaint of Captain William B. . . .

THORNTON v. UNITED STATES, 102 F. Supp. 554 (Ct. Cl. 1952)

. . . . §§ 201.1 to 201.23 as amended January 8, 1943> 8 Fed.Reg. 393— 401 provide, in §§ 201.10 and 201.27 . . .

OTIS THORNTON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND OTIS THORNTON AS THE SURVIVING MEMBER OF AND IN BEHALF OF BOSWELL- KAHN- THORNTON COMMISSION CO. AND KAHN AND THORNTON COMMISSION CO. v. THE UNITED STATES, 121 Ct. Cl. 520 (Ct. Cl. 1952)

. . . . §§ 201.1 to 201.23 as amended January 8, 1943, 8 Fed. . . .

P. E. HARRIS CO. v. MULLANEY, 87 F. Supp. 248 (D. Alaska 1949)

. . . . § 234; 50 C.F.R. 201.1-2, 201.4; Cum.Supp. 201.6-11; 1946 Supp., 201.23-26; 1947 Supp., 201.25a. . . .

P. E. HARRIS CO. v. MULLANEY, 12 Alaska 476 (D. Alaska 1949)

. . . . § 234; 50 C.F.R. 201.1-2, 201.4; Cum.Supp. 201.6-11; 1946 Supp., 201.23-26; 1947 Supp., 201.25a. . . .

SOUTHERN ELECTRIC COMPANY v. STODDARD, SUPERINTENDENT, 269 U.S. 186 (U.S. 1925)

. . . contracts for supplies and materials, including a contract with the Southern Electric Company for $201.23 . . .

STONE- ORDEAN- WELLS CO. v. MARK, 227 F. 975 (8th Cir. 1915)

. . . levy $211.93, retained $10.70 in payment of his fees and costs and paid over to the Stone Company $201.23 . . . It was the right to recover of the bank $201.23 and the sheriff’s fees for collecting this amount. . . .

THAMES v. MILLER, 23 F. Cas. 887 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1873)

. . . Blunt for $3,-201.23 and costs. . . .