The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title V
JUDICIAL BRANCH

Chapter 30
SHERIFFS

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F.S. 30.15

30.15 Powers, duties, and obligations.—

(1) Sheriffs, in their respective counties, in person or by deputy, shall:

(a) Execute all process of the Supreme Court, circuit courts, county courts, and boards of county commissioners of this state, to be executed in their counties.

(b) Execute such other writs, processes, warrants, and other papers directed to them, as may come to their hands to be executed in their counties.

(d) Execute all orders of the boards of county commissioners of their counties, for which services they shall receive such compensation, out of the county treasury, as said boards may deem proper.

(e) Be conservators of the peace in their counties.

(f) Suppress tumults, riots, and unlawful assemblies in their counties with force and strong hand when necessary.

(g) Apprehend, without warrant, any person disturbing the peace, and carry that person before the proper judicial officer, that further proceedings may be had against him or her according to law.

(h) Have authority to raise the power of the county and command any person to assist them, when necessary, in the execution of the duties of their office; and, whoever, not being physically incompetent, refuses or neglects to render such assistance, shall be punished by imprisonment in jail not exceeding 1 year, or by fine not exceeding $500.

(i) Be, ex officio, timber agents for their counties.

(j) Perform such other duties as may be imposed upon them by law.

(k) Assist district school boards and charter school governing boards in complying with, or private schools in exercising options in, s. 1006.12. A sheriff must, at a minimum, provide access to a Chris Hixon, Coach Aaron Feis, and Coach Scott Beigel Guardian Program to aid in the prevention or abatement of active assailant incidents on school premises, as required under this paragraph. Persons certified as school guardians pursuant to this paragraph have no authority to act in any law enforcement capacity except to the extent necessary to prevent or abate an active assailant incident.

1.a. If a local school board has voted by a majority to implement a guardian program, the sheriff in that county shall establish a guardian program to provide training, pursuant to subparagraph 2., to school district, charter school, or private school employees, either directly or through a contract with another sheriff’s office that has established a guardian program.

b. A charter school governing board in a school district that has not voted, or has declined, to implement a guardian program may request the sheriff in the county to establish a guardian program for the purpose of training the charter school employees. If the county sheriff denies the request, the charter school governing board may contract with a sheriff that has established a guardian program to provide such training. The charter school governing board must notify the superintendent and the sheriff in the charter school’s county of the contract prior to its execution.

c. A private school in a school district that has not voted, or has declined, to implement a guardian program may request that the sheriff in the county of the private school establish a guardian program for the purpose of training private school employees. If the county sheriff denies the request, the private school may contract with a sheriff from another county who has established a guardian program to provide such training. The private school must notify the sheriff in the private school’s county of the contract with a sheriff from another county before its execution. The private school is responsible for all training costs for a school guardian program. The sheriff providing such training must ensure that any moneys paid by a private school are not commingled with any funds provided by the state to the sheriff as reimbursement for screening-related and training-related costs of any school district or charter school employee.

d. The training program required in sub-subparagraph 2.b. is a standardized statewide curriculum, and each sheriff providing such training shall adhere to the course of instruction specified in that sub-subparagraph. This subparagraph does not prohibit a sheriff from providing additional training. A school guardian who has completed the training program required in sub-subparagraph 2.b. may not be required to attend another sheriff’s training program pursuant to that sub-subparagraph unless there has been at least a 1-year break in his or her employment as a guardian.

e. The sheriff conducting the training pursuant to subparagraph 2. will be reimbursed for screening-related and training-related costs and for providing a one-time stipend of $500 to each school guardian who participates in the school guardian program.

2. A sheriff who establishes a program shall consult with the Department of Law Enforcement on programmatic guiding principles, practices, and resources, and shall certify as school guardians, without the power of arrest, school employees, as specified in s. 1006.12(3), who:

a. Hold a valid license issued under s. 790.06.

b. Complete a 144-hour training program, consisting of 12 hours of certified nationally recognized diversity training and 132 total hours of comprehensive firearm safety and proficiency training conducted by Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission-certified instructors, which must include:

(I) Eighty hours of firearms instruction based on the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission’s Law Enforcement Academy training model, which must include at least 10 percent but no more than 20 percent more rounds fired than associated with academy training. Program participants must achieve an 85 percent pass rate on the firearms training.

(II) Sixteen hours of instruction in precision pistol.

(III) Eight hours of discretionary shooting instruction using state-of-the-art simulator exercises.

(IV) Sixteen hours of instruction in active shooter or assailant scenarios.

(V) Eight hours of instruction in defensive tactics.

(VI) Four hours of instruction in legal issues.

c. Pass a psychological evaluation administered by a psychologist licensed under chapter 490 and designated by the Department of Law Enforcement and submit the results of the evaluation to the sheriff’s office. The Department of Law Enforcement is authorized to provide the sheriff’s office with mental health and substance abuse data for compliance with this paragraph.

d. Submit to and pass an initial drug test and subsequent random drug tests in accordance with the requirements of s. 112.0455 and the sheriff’s office.

e. Successfully complete ongoing training, weapon inspection, and firearm qualification on at least an annual basis.

The sheriff who conducts the guardian training shall issue a school guardian certificate to individuals who meet the requirements of this section to the satisfaction of the sheriff, and shall maintain documentation of weapon and equipment inspections, as well as the training, certification, inspection, and qualification records of each school guardian certified by the sheriff. An individual who is certified under this paragraph may serve as a school guardian under s. 1006.12(3) only if he or she is appointed by the applicable school district superintendent, charter school principal, or private school head of school.

(2) Sheriffs, in their respective counties, in person or by deputy, shall, at the will of the board of county commissioners, attend, in person or by deputy, all meetings of the boards of county commissioners of their counties, for which services they shall receive such compensation, out of the county treasury, as said boards may deem proper.

(3) Every sheriff shall incorporate an antiracial or other antidiscriminatory profiling policy into the sheriff’s policies and practices, utilizing the Florida Police Chiefs Association Model Policy as a guide. Antiprofiling policies shall include the elements of definitions, traffic stop procedures, community education and awareness efforts, and policies for the handling of complaints from the public.

(4)(a) In accordance with each county’s obligation under s. 14, Art. V of the State Constitution and s. 29.008 to fund security for trial court facilities, the sheriff of each county shall coordinate with the board of county commissioners of that county and the chief judge of the circuit in which that county is located on the development of a comprehensive plan for the provision of security for trial court facilities. Each sheriff shall retain authority over the implementation and provision of law enforcement services associated with the plan. The chief judge of the circuit shall retain decisionmaking authority to ensure the protection of due process rights, including, but not limited to, the scheduling and conduct of trials and other judicial proceedings as part of his or her responsibility for the administrative supervision of trial courts under s. 43.26.

(b) Sheriffs and their deputies, employees, and contractors are officers of the court when providing security for trial court facilities under this subsection.

(5) As required by s. 1(d), Art. VIII of the State Constitution, there shall be an elected sheriff in each Florida county and the transfer of the sheriff’s duties to another officer or office is prohibited.

(a) Unless otherwise authorized by state law, the sheriff shall have exclusive policing jurisdiction in the unincorporated areas of each county. The sheriff’s jurisdiction and powers must run throughout the entire county regardless of whether there are incorporated cities or other independent districts or governmental entities in the county. The sheriff’s jurisdiction is concurrent with any city, district, or other law enforcement agency that has jurisdiction in a city or district.

(b) A police department or other policing entity may not be maintained or established by the county’s board of county commissioners, or any other county legislative body, to provide any policing in the unincorporated area of any county. Unless otherwise authorized by state law, only the duly elected sheriff may provide such policing and police functions in the unincorporated area of any county. A county may not contract with or engage in any manner with an incorporated city’s or district’s police department to provide any services provided by the sheriff, including policing or police functions in the unincorporated area of any county. Nothing in this paragraph affects the jurisdiction or powers of any agency of the State of Florida or the United States or prohibits mutual aid agreements between the sheriff and any other police department.

History.—s. 14, ch. 4, 1845; ss. 1, 4, ch. 157, 1848; s. 9, ch. 1626, 1868; ss. 1, 2, ch. 1659, 1868; RS 650, 651, 653, 1241, 1242, 2583; GS 991, 992, 994, 1670, 1671, 3503; RGS 1804, 1805, 1807, 2875, 2876, 5388; CGL 2856, 2857, 2859, 4572, 4573, 7527; s. 4, ch. 22790, 1945; s. 4, ch. 73-334; s. 1, ch. 91-95; s. 179, ch. 95-147; s. 2, ch. 2001-264; s. 5, ch. 2013-25; s. 5, ch. 2018-3; s. 9, ch. 2019-3; s. 1, ch. 2019-22; s. 1, ch. 2020-100; s. 2, ch. 2023-18; s. 1, ch. 2023-156.

Note.—Former ss. 144.01-144.03, 30.16.

F.S. 30.15 on Google Scholar

F.S. 30.15 on Casetext

Amendments to 30.15

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 30.15

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 30.15.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

SOLIANUS, INC. v. UNITED STATES, DAK LLC, Ya, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1331 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2019)

. . . ), the court sustains Commerce's methodology in calculating the all-others antidumping duty rate of 30.15 . . . TCK received a de minimis rate and Commerce preliminary calculated an all-others rate of 30.15 percent . . . major changes to these rates in its Final Determination and continued to assign the average rate of 30.15 . . . The court upholds the resulting 30.15 percent all-others antidumping rate assigned to Plaintiffs. . . . That is, Plaintiffs have offered no reason why the resulting 30.15 percent all-others rate failed to . . .

J. ISRAEL, v. DESANTIS,, 269 So. 3d 491 (Fla. 2019)

. . . Section 30.15(e), Florida Statutes (2018), makes sheriffs "in person or by deputy" the "conservators . . .

IN RE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, In, 366 F. Supp. 3d 256 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Action...363 30.13 Post-Effective Date Fees and Expenses...363 30.14 Securities Act Exemption...363 30.15 . . . prospectus delivery or qualification prior to the offering, issuance, distribution, or sale of securities. 30.15 . . .

IN RE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, In, 363 F. Supp. 3d 220 (D. P.R. 2019)

. . . Action...325 30.13 Post-Effective Date Fees and Expenses...325 30.14 Securities Act Exemption...326 30.15 . . . prospectus delivery or qualification prior to the offering, issuance, distribution, or sale of securities. 30.15 . . .

M. KNIGHT, v. CHIEF JUDGE OF FLORIDA S TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT E., 235 So. 3d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . The Sheriff argues that by directing him to provide -security beyond the dictates of section 30.15, Florida . . . the literal four corners of a courtroom wherein sessions of court are actually held because section 30.15 . . . the Sheriff to, in relevant part, “[ajttend all sessions of the circuit court and county court.” § 30.15 . . . In an attempt to meet this burden, the Sheriff argues that section 30.15 defines the exclusive scope . . . However, section 30.15(l)(j) explicitly requires the Sheriff to “[p]erform such other duties as may be . . .

I. ERMINI, f k a I. v. SCOTT,, 249 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 30.15(l)(e). . . .

STANLEY, v. ISRAEL,, 843 F.3d 920 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 30.15. . . .

COVINGTON, v. NORTH CAROLINA,, 316 F.R.D. 117 (M.D.N.C. 2016)

. . . BVAP was benchmark House District 59, which had a BVAP of 23.52% under the 2000 census, which grew to 30.15% . . .

BURNS, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,, 147 So. 3d 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Section 30.15(1), Florida Statutes (2013), provides for a sheriff’s territorial authority, in pertinent . . .

STATE v. A. R. R. a, 113 So. 3d 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 30.15(1), Florida Statutes (2011), states, in relevant part, that “[s]heriffs, in their respective . . .

RACK ROOM SHOES, SKIZ LLC, v. UNITED STATES,, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2012)

. . . than those of heading 6104 those of heading 6103 12 Subheading: 30.10: Of man-made fi- Subheading: 30.15 . . .

UNITED STATES v. PINKIN,, 675 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2012)

. . . Investigation Report’s recommendation, for base offense level purposes the district court attributed to Pinkin 30.15 . . .

EDELMAN ARTS, INC. v. ART INTERNATIONAL UK LTD., 841 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . .”); see also 8 Corbin on Contracts § 30.15 (“If one promises to pay money out of funds yet to be acquired . . .

SIRACO, v. J. ASTRUE,, 806 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D. Me. 2011)

. . . motion, with the following explanation: When the $5,366.62 in requested § 406(b) fees is divided by the 30.15 . . . Specifically, of the 30.15 hours performed before this Court, only 4.7 hours were performed by an attorney . . .

TRI- M GROUP, LLC, v. B. SHARP,, 705 F. Supp. 2d 335 (D. Del. 2010)

. . . . § 30.15(a)(1). . . . See 29 C.F.R. § 30.15(a)(3). . The Stong decision was unpublished. . . .

WALLACE, v. Ed DEAN,, 3 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 30.15, Fla.Stat. (2004) (outlining the basic powers, duties, and obligations of Florida’s sheriffs . . .

D. SHARRARD, v. STATE, 998 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . . § 30.15, Fla. . . .

K. BALL, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, 548 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . Stat. 30.15; State v. . . .

MARTINEZ, v. STATE, 965 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 30.15(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

STATE v. EDDIE,, 949 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . In both cases, Eddie’s scoresheet resulted in the lowest permissible prison sentence of 30.15 months. . . . Here, Eddie’s guideline sentence for both cases was for a minimum of 30.15 months. . . .

M. GORDON, v. J. GORDON,, 932 So. 2d 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See also § 30.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005); Sanders v. Laird, 865 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). . . .

ABUSAID, Jr. a. k. a. v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, s a s, 405 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2005)

. . . Stat. § 30.15. . . . Stat. § 30.15(1), (2). Cf. . . . Stat. § 30.15(l)(a), or when he attends terms of the county court, id. § S0.15(l)(c), or when he executes . . . the ordérs of the board of county commissioners, id.- § 30.15(l)(d). . . . Id. § 30.15(2) (emphasis added). . . .

COMMITTEE FOR REASONABLE REGULATION OF LAKE TAHOE, a v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY,, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D. Nev. 2005)

. . . (Id. at §§ 30.15.C(4)(b), (5)(b).) . . . (Id. at § 30.15.E.) . . . The independent review may employ an independent expert using TRPA’s methodology (Id. at § 30.15.E(1) . . . panel members that may use other professionally accepted methods of evaluating scenic impacts (Id. at § 30.15 . . .

THE COMMITTEE FOR REASONABLE REGULATION OF LAKE TAHOE, a v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY, a, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D. Nev. 2004)

. . . (Code §§ 30.15.C(4)(a)(iii), 30.15. . . . (Id. at § 30.15.C(4)(b), (5)(b).) . . . (Id. at § 30.15.E.) . . . (Id. at § 30.15.E(2).) . . . (Id. at 30.15.C(3).) . . .

O SHEA, v. J. WELCH,, 350 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2003)

. . . Guides — Civil 30.15 (4th ed.1999); N.Y. Pattern Jury Instr. — Civil 2:235 (2002). . . .

MURRAY, a MURRAY, v. UNITED STATES, 258 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (D. Minn. 2003)

. . . the Minnesota model jury instruction for determining vicarious liability in negligence cases, CIV JIG 30.15 . . . JIG 30.15, 4 Minnesota Practice 197 (West Group 1999). . . .

JENNE, v. MARANTO,, 825 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . See § 30.15(1)(a), Fla. . . .

ALEXIS, INC. M L v. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . Further, as was previously found by the court, Florida Statutes section 30.15 mandates that sheriffs . . . Stat. ch. 30.15; 901.15(1)). . . . the adult use ordinances, the mere fact of his enforcement as mandated by Florida Statutes section 30.15 . . .

In SELECT COMFORT CORPORATION SECURITIES LITIGATION, 202 F.R.D. 598 (D. Minn. 2001)

. . . permitting use of subclasses in securities litigation); Manual For Complex Litigation (Third) (1995) § 30.15 . . .

DIAZ, v. STATE, 737 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . On January 5, 1999, he pled guilty in an Osceola County criminal case and was sentenced to 30.15 months . . .

CUNNINGHAM, v. GIBSON ELECTRIC CO. INC., 43 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 1999)

. . . 2 to June 4,1995 at the rate of $29.15 per hour, from June 4, 1995 to June 3, 1996 at the rate of $30.15 . . . from June 1, 1995 through May 31, 1996, 155 hours of overtime when his regular hourly rate of pay was $30.15 . . . times $29.15, or $5,618.66; for the period from June 1, 1995 through May 31, 1996 is 155 times 1 times $30.15 . . .

THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, v. FROELICH,, 41 F. Supp. 2d 227 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . Calcu Gas, Inc., 754 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir.1985) (citing 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30.15 . . .

SAMARCO, v. NEUMANN,, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 1999)

. . . VIII, § 1(d); §§ 30.073, 30.079, 30.15, 30.53, Fla.Stat. . . . .

In ROUTE ONE WEST WINDSOR LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,, 225 B.R. 76 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998)

. . . Queenajst, JR., Chapter 11 Theory And Practice: A Guide To Reorganization § 30.15 at 30:49 (1994) (concluding . . . Queenan, Jr., ChapteR 11 Theory & PRACTICE § 30.15, at 30:49 (1994) states: [In re Entz-White Lumber . . . Queenan, Jr., Chapter 11 Theory & Practioe § 30.15, at 30:49 (1994)). . . .

In LIBERTY WAREHOUSE ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,, 220 B.R. 546 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . Queenan, Jr., Chapter 11 Theory and Practice: A Guide to Reorganization § 30.15 at 30:49 (1994) (concluding . . .

In ACE- TEXAS, INC. U. S., 217 B.R. 719 (Bankr. D. Del. 1998)

. . . Queenan, Jr., Chapter 11 Theory & Practice § 30.15, at 30:49 (1994). . . .

G. BROMLEY, R. R. M. W. B. J. M. B. E. L. L. L. L. J. E. W. v. MICHIGAN EDUCATION ASSOCIATION- NEA,, 178 F.R.D. 148 (E.D. Mich. 1998)

. . . See Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, § 30.15, at 216.... * * * Defendants also rely on Korwek v . . .

ALL- TIME TOWING, INC. d b a JD s d b a J. d b a v. A. McCUTCHEON,, 701 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . roadways, appellants point to the absence of any express authorization for this activity in section 30.15 . . . is no express authorization for the sheriff to enter into contracts with towing companies, section 30.15 . . .

STATE v. G. MULLER,, 693 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1997)

. . . We note in passing that section 30.15, Florida Statutes (1993), provides that the sheriff shall execute . . .

In TELECTRONICS PACING SYSTEMS, INC. J, 168 F.R.D. 203 (S.D. Ohio 1996)

. . . .”); Manual for Complex Litigation (Third) § 30.15 (1995) (“Each class or subclass must independently . . .

MORLEY S AUTO BODY, INC. a d b a s d b a s Ap- v. HUNTER, L. a s s, 70 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1995)

. . . The plaintiffs rely on Fla.Stat.Ann. sections 30.15, 30.53, and 316.640 as support for the proposition . . . Section 30.15 defines the general “[p]owers, duties, and obligations” of county sheriffs but contains . . . Ann. § 30.15 (West 1988). . . .

A. GEORGINE, v. AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. v. ADMIRAL INSURANCE COMPANY,, 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994)

. . . .) § 30.15 at 215 ("[I]f necessary to assure adequacy of representation, [the Court] may appoint another . . .

P. ROMERO T. v. STATE, 641 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . . §§ 30.07 and 30.15(l)(b), Fla.Stat. (1991); see also Tanner v. . . .

J. D AGUANNO, W. v. J. GALLAGHER, E. Jr. A. A. III,, 827 F. Supp. 1558 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

. . . . § 30.15 (West Supp.1993) (providing that Florida sheriffs and sheriffs deputies have a duty to enforce . . .

B. REICH, v. CHEZ ROBERT, INC., 821 F. Supp. 967 (D.N.J. 1993)

. . . Maint. 18 30.15 488.00 15.00 Gross 533.15 58 0.00 870.00 870.00 Magin 11 0.00 194.00 165.00 359.00 Makorey . . .

TRIEF, v. DUN BRADSTREET CORPORATION, W. N., 144 F.R.D. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . See Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, § 30.15, at 216 (to protect class members’ interests “[rjeplacement . . .

LITTLE CAESAR ENTERPRISES, INC. a v. R- J- L FOODS, INC. a, 796 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Mich. 1992)

. . . Id. at 95 (citing 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30.15 (2d ed 1984)). . . .

PUBLIC CITIZEN, INC. v. U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, 940 F.2d 679 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

. . . See, e.g., 10 CFR § 30.15(a) (1991) (exemptions through rulemakings); id. § 30.11(a) (case-by-ease exemption . . .

In IVAN F. BOESKY SECURITIES LITIGATION, 120 F.R.D. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)

. . . Manual for Complex Litigation, Second § 30.15, at 216 (footnotes omitted). . . .

CUTHILL EDDY, v. SHERIFF OF SEMINOLE COUNTY,, 494 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . See § 30.15(2), Fla.Stat. (1985). A deputy took the writ to the address of “Patricia A. . . .

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL, a a a v. ELMIRA MISSION OF THE CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY, a a k a a k a a k a a k a, 794 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986)

. . . (Citing 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30.15 (2d ed. 1984)). . . .

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, v. GIBSON CHEMICAL OIL CORP. J. d b a Co. G., 786 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1986)

. . . McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30.15 at 485. . . .

E. REMY MARTIN CO. S. A. v. SHAW- ROSS INTERNATIONAL IMPORTS, INC. d b a F., 756 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1985)

. . . McCarthy, § 30.15. . FLA.STAT.ANN. § 495.151 (West 1984). . See Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. . . .

POWER TEST PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. CALCU GAS, INC., 754 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1985)

. . . See 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 30.15 (2d ed. 1984). . . .

J. EVERTON, Jr. v. WILLARD, d b a s s TRINKO, v. R. WILLARD, d b a C. W. s, 426 So. 2d 996 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . We also reject any assertion that sections 30.07 and 30.15, Florida Statutes (1979), creates a special . . . Section 30.15, Florida Statutes (1979): Powers, duties, and obligations. — Sheriffs, in their respective . . .

TAYLOR, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,, 552 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Pa. 1982)

. . . . § 30.15(a)(4)) and to adopt a state equal opportunity plan for such programs (29 C.F.R. § 30.15(a)( . . . enforcement schemes lies within BAT’s discretion as delimited by the applicable regulations (see 29 C.F.R. § 30.15 . . .

CLINTON, v. STATE, 421 So. 2d 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Pursuant to section 30.15, Florida Statutes (1981), the sheriff of Pasco County or his deputy had the . . .

FLORIDA BUSINESSMEN FOR FREE ENTERPRISE, a a Co. a v. STATE OF FLORIDA, a a, 499 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Fla. 1980)

. . . See, §§ 27.02, 27.03, 30.15, Fla. Stat. (1979); Art. 5, Fla.Const. § 17; Art. 8, Fla.Const. § 1(d). . . .

UNIROYAL, INC. AFL- CIO- CLC, v. MARSHALL, J., 482 F. Supp. 364 (D.D.C. 1979)

. . . . §§ 60-30.9, 30.10, 30.11, 30.15. . . . See 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.15(j). . . . In that respect, plaintiff refers primarily to the fact that section 60-30.15(j) of the regulations does . . . Section 60-30.15 gives the ALJ “all powers necessary” to conduct a fair hearing and in-eludes, but is . . . Section 60-30.15(j) lists the power to “impose appropriate sanctions which may include" the three specified . . .

N. BERKMAN P. v. RUST CRAFT GREETING CARDS, INC. L. A., 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)

. . . Lehman recommended a somewhat higher price of $30.15 to $33.30. . . .

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. F. O NEILL, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977)

. . . December 4, 1970, to May 22, 1973, and that such time would have been billed at the hourly rate of $30.15 . . . constant throughout these two time periods, and she requests compensation at the two-thirds rate of $30.15 . . . $165.83 Flovd 12/4/70-5/22/73 .75 33.50 (% x $50) Sonnenfeld 5/23/73-8/29/75 8/29/75-3/26/76 505.50 9.25 30.15 . . . x $45) 30.15 x $45) Lehane 5/23/73-8/29/75 Less: 5/23/73-8/29/75 88.25 26.80 (% x $40) 41.25 x 26.80 . . . increase in his regular hourly fee from $45 to $55, so that the respective two-third figures would be $30.15 . . .

REED, III, v. A. RHODES, 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976)

. . . Clair 18.37% 283/490 6 Tod 30.15% 252/490 7 Waring 6.77% 576/630 '0 Warren 5.85% 259/770 9 Woodland 2.49% . . .

UNITED STATES v. RESERVE MINING COMPANY, 394 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1974)

. . . The Court at that time did not decide Wisconsin’s claim that the discharge also violates Wis.Stat. 30.15 . . . However, in that Section 30.15 declares that a violation of Sec. 30.12 is a public nuisance, the Court . . . hereby finds that the discharge also violates Sec. 30.15. . . . waste into Lake Superior is in violation of the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407; Wis.Stat. §§ 30.12 and 30.15 . . .

UNITED STATES v. RESERVE MINING COMPANY, 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974)

. . . . § 30.15(4), and is a nuisance per se. . . .

STATE L. WAINWRIGHT, v. W. BOOTH,, 291 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . . § 30.15(6) (1971), F.S.A., provides that the sheriff shall be the conservator of the peace in his county . . . Section 30.15(4) specifies that the sheriff, in person or by deputy, shall attend all terms of court. . . .

CONNECTICUT BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, A. v. UNITED STATES, 439 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1971)

. . . An algebraic formula, cf. 4 Mertens, Law of Federal Gift and E'state Taxation § 30.15, pp. 687-89 (1959 . . .

E. PURDY, v. EVANS,, 231 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1970)

. . . The trial court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, held paragraphs 30.15(a) and 30.15 (b), Code of Metropolitan . . .

PERINI CORPORATION, WALSH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, AND RALPH E. MILLS COMPANY, AND BLYTHE BROS. COMPANY, INC. BODIES CORPORATE AND JOINT VENTURERS TRADING UNDER THE NAME OF PERINI, WALSH, MILLS BLYTHE BROS. CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES v. THE UNITED STATES, 180 Ct. Cl. 768 (Ct. Cl. 1967)

. . . $97,397, which, when divided by the 323,000 units, produced an estimated direct unit cost of pumping of 30.15 . . . $17,997 for the 323,000 estimated units, as against the original Job estimate of 37.3 cents per unit, and 30.15 . . .

D. ENGLAND J. v. UNITED STATES, 226 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ill. 1964)

. . . following items: motel room expense, $24,00; reimbursement to friend for use of apartment, $12.00; meals, $30.15 . . .

STATE v. BURTS, 24 Fla. Supp. 88 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1964)

. . . operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating beverages in violation of section 30.15 . . . finding appellant guilty while driving under the influence of alcoholic beverage in violation of section 30.15 . . .

STATE v. JOINER, 17 Fla. Supp. 84 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1961)

. . . metropolitan court in and for Dade County, on a charge of driving while intoxicated in violation of § 30.15 . . .

STATE v. GRIGGS, 17 Fla. Supp. 2 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1960)

. . . The charge was a violation of section 30.15 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, which reads as follows . . .

R. A. M. v. C. B. A. v., 32 T.C. 104 (T.C. 1959)

. . . Water heaters. 698.93 404.17 240.17 111. 67 64.86 30.15 Venetian blinds. 146.03 11,351.10 3,071.82 11,648.33 . . .

WESTERN CONTRACTING CORPORATION v. THE UNITED STATES, 144 Ct. Cl. 318 (Ct. Cl. 1958)

. . . Altogether, this equipment accounted for 47.11 percent of the value of all equipment used on the job (30.15 . . .

BLACKBURN v. BROREIN, 70 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1954)

. . . of whether deputy sheriffs are officers or employees, their powers and duties are defined by Section 30.15 . . .

TRATHEN v. UNITED STATES, 96 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1951)

. . . Thereafter, and until May 1, 1950 when a “suspend payment” order was issued, $30.15 was paid monthly . . . Monthly installments of $30.15 are payable through December 12, 1958 and a final installment of $25.25 . . .

RICHARD FIELDS v. STATE OF FLORIDA, 160 Fla. 877 (Fla. 1948)

. . . See Section 30.15, Fla. Stat., 1941, F.S.A. (Cumulative supplement.) . . .

v., 12 Cust. Ct. 478 (Cust. Ct. 1944)

. . . M. 30.15 per 100 kilos. * * * and in not entering judgment holding the merchandise dutiable on the basis . . . M. 30.15 per 100 kilos. * * * . We therefore make the following findings of facts: 1. . . . M. 30.15 per 100 kilos, and for unturned tubing R. . . .

STATE JOE E. BROWN, v. E. G. DUCKWORTH,, 153 Fla. 739 (Fla. 1943)

. . . Section 30.15, Pla. Stats. 1941. . . .

SHAW v. EASTERN TRANSP. CO. THE RUTH SHAW, 52 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1943)

. . . pier have been stipulated as follows: “ 8 a.m. 30.34 11 a.m. 30.26 Noon 30.22 1 p.m. 30.18 2 o’clock 30.15 . . .

v., 6 Cust. Ct. 832 (Cust. Ct. 1941)

. . . total of which is, for the unturned tubing, 27.90 reichsmarks per 100 kilos, and for the turned tubing, 30.15 . . .

v., 4 Cust. Ct. 630 (Cust. Ct. 1940)

. . . Therefore, the cost per 100 kilos is 27.90 reichsmarks for the black or unturned tubing and 30.15 reichsmarks . . .

LLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. v. MINNESOTA, 309 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1940)

. . . Appellant, an Illinois railroad corporation, owns no lines in Minnesota but operates leased lines with 30.15 . . .

CASTAGNINO v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS N, 157 F. 29 (6th Cir. 1907)

. . . In that month the mortuary call was increased to $30.15 (or $180.90 per annum). . . .

LAMB v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS N, 106 F. 637 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1901)

. . . Lamb was paying under policy Ho. 15,975 a mortuary assessment of §30.15 every two mouths at the date . . .